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The passivity of the demand for pension products is one 
of the striking features of mandatory pension systems. 
Consequently, the provision of multiple investment 
alternatives to households (multifund schemes) does 
not ensure that contributions are invested efficiently.  
In addition, despite the theoretical findings that short 
term return maximization is not conductive to long-
term return maximization, the regulatory framework 
of pension fund management companies puts excessive 
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emphasis on short-term maximization. Therefore, it is 
not obvious that typical regulatory framework of pension 
funds is conductive to optimal pensions. By establishing 
a set of default options on investment portfolios, this 
paper proposes a mechanism to align the incentives 
of the pension fund management companies with the 
long-term objectives of the contributors. The paper 
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I.   Introduction 
 
2. The principal objective of a contributory pension system is to ensure that contributors 
receive adequate replacement rates at retirement.
2  While in defined benefit systems 
(DB) the liability for the provision of pensions rests with the program sponsor, which is 
typically the state or an insurance company; in mandatory defined contribution systems 
(DC) the adequacy of the  expected pension to a great extent  falls on the selection of 
investments made by the contributor. 
 
3. Additionally, while supervisory schemes in DB models put emphasis on ensuring 
that pension funds have resources to pay the pensions promised, the supervisory focus 
for  DC  schemes  is  on  ensuring  that  the  pension  funds  act  within  the  parameters 
established  by  regulation.  From  this  perspective,  investment  regulation  plays  a 
significant role in the future of the contributors in DC funds, and therefore, regulation 
should aim at pension funds following consistent investment strategies for contributors 
to achieve adequate replacement rates in the future. 
 
4. Recent literature has shown that life cycle investment strategies are the most efficient 
strategies from the long term perspective. Properly built life cycle strategies maximize 
the  welfare  of  individuals,  by  way  of  focusing  on  the  long  term  objectives  of  the 
pension funds , for example, Campbell and Viceira (2002), Blake et al. (2008), Rudolph 
and others (2010). 
 
5. The presumption is that the provision of investment options to individuals does not 
free  governments  from  the  responsibility  of  providing  reasonable  pensions,  either 
publicly or privately managed, funded or unfunded. If individuals perceive that their 
pensions are below their expectations, the demand for change will surely arise.  In this 
vein, the high proportion of government bonds in the pension portfolios in Colombia —
as well as in most of the other countries that have reformed their pension system— 
seems to indicate the need for the asset allocation to be improved in order to ensure that 
individuals receive pensions that are aligned with their expectations. 
 
6. For most individuals, the amount of future pensions is the only valid tool to measure 
the performance of a pension fund. Recent literature regarding consumer behavior and 
financial  literacy  highlights  the  inability  of  average  individuals  to  make  investment 
decisions that are related to long-term horizons; Benartzi and Thaler (2007). In this 
sense,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  average  contributor  feels  incapable  of  making 
portfolio investment decisions, and ends up relying on simple rules or following advice 
that most likely has little to do with the criterion of optimality. For example, if more 
than half of individuals adopt poor decisions regarding their pension fund investments, 
and future pensions fall below expectations, it is likely that this will translate into a 
political problem for future governments. The developments in the financial literature 
on this specific subject are incipient, and unlikely to provide practical advice for at least 
two decades. 
 
                                                 
2 The replacement rate is defined as the amount of the pension divided by the final salary.  
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7. For  this  reason,  mandatory  funded  pension  systems  should  be  able  to  offer 
investment strategies that act as a ―smart‖ default option for individuals that are not able 
to make informed decisions. While people should be free to choose the best investment 
portfolio  that  appears  within  the  available  options,  it  is  in  the  best  interest  of  the 
government  to  ensure  that  the  funds  of  those  who  do  not  exercise  that  option  are 
invested  in  strategies  that  maximize  their  expected  future  pension  subject  to  a 
predefined set of risks.  The development of optimal default options imposes a series of 
challenges on the investment regulation. Although this approach has not been adopted 
by  other  countries  with  mandatory  open  pension  systems,  is  common  in  more 
sophisticated voluntary pension systems and in public funds.
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8. The  most  practical  way  of  implementing  these  default  options  is  to  allocate 
individuals who have not made an explicit selection of pension fund by age (and other 
attributes as appropriate) to a determined pension fund (or a combination of them). The 
pension fund investment  policy should follow the  benchmark portfolio  closely. The 
benchmark portfolio should be designed to maximize the expected long-term returns of 
individuals. It is proposed that the strategic asset allocation be determined exogenously 
by a group of ―wise persons.‖ 
 
9. The organization of the document is as follows: Section II explains the conceptual 
motivation of investment regulation; Section III elaborates on this; beginning with the 
perspective of a benevolent planner, then analyzes the considerations that should guide 
the  investments  for  a  long-term  investor;  Section  IV  addresses  the  causes  of  and 
solutions  to  a  possible  misalignment  of  incentives  between  fund  managers  and 
contributors that occurs in pension systems such as the Colombian system; Section V 
discusses the design of the structural limits of the Colombian pension system; Section 
VI presents a portfolio optimization model for long-term investors; Section VII analyzes 
the relative considerations of the benchmark portfolio; and Section VIII concludes with 
a discussion regarding minimum returns. A detailed explanation of the more technical 
aspects of the model presented in Section VI is available in the appendices at the end of 
the document. 
II.  Fundamentals of investment regulation 
 
10.  Due to a number of market imperfections, investment regulation plays an important 
role guiding pension fund managers towards the investments that maximize the future 
pensions of individuals. In particular, this paper identifies three areas that justify the 
existence of regulation: (i) passivity of the demand for pension services; (ii) market 
structure; and (iii) short-term horizon  of pension fund managers. 
 
2.1  Passivity of demand for pension services 
 
11.  In a world of rational contributors and multiple investment opportunities, the role 
of  investment  regulation  is  relatively  limited.  Based  on  strategic  asset  allocation, 
contributors  choose  a  pension  fund  that  best  fits  their  risk  profile,  taking  into 
consideration a number of factors relevant to them, including age, human capital, the 
existence of other sources of retirement income, the expected density of contributions 
                                                 
3 In 2010, Sweden adopted a life cycle framework for its default portfolio.  
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and risk aversion; de Palma and Prigent (2008, 2009). In addition, individuals change 
pension funds based on performance (not short term returns), thus the pension fund 
managers  with  superior  performance  tend  to  grow  in  comparison  with  those  which 
underperform.  Thus,  the  market  is  regulated  and  portfolio  allocations  move  toward 
optimal  allocations.  This  (surrealistic)  framework  assumes  that  pension  contributors 
know their optimal investment strategy and that pension fund managers then only have 
to  offer  these  investment  strategies  so  that  the  contributors  may  then  select  the 
investment options. 
 
12.  Empirical  evidence,  however,  has  made  it  clear  that  these  assumptions  are  not 
valid, and therefore it becomes necessary to design pension systems based on more 
realistic assumptions. This will require assuming that contributors do not have a solid 
foundation to select a pension fund; the investment options are limited; and pension 
fund managers have strong incentives to maximize short-term returns. 
 
13.  In mandatory pension fund plans, people typically choose pension funds strongly 
encouraged by the sales force. According to Marinovic and Valdes (2005), the main 
variable explaining the choice of a pension fund management company is a visit by a 
sales agent.  Berstein and Cabrita (2007) also corroborate this finding, but they claim 
that returns, coupled with a visit from a sales agent, offer a strong fuller explanation.  
This means that short-term returns are a persuasive rationale to switch to a different 
pension fund management company. The work of Calderón et al. (2008), using data 
from Mexico, shows that people generally do not switch to their optimal alternatives. 
 
14.  The selection of a pension fund based on its attributes is not necessarily the most 
appropriate  action.  Although  the  cited  literature  finds  clear  evidence  of  price 
inelasticity, there is confusion by what is meant by the price for members.  In particular, 
these studies take short-term past returns from pension funds to explain the decisions of 
individuals. However, theory indicates that these variables should not be the principal 
explanations for portfolio selection, since it is already well-known that past performance 
is not a good predictor of future returns, and that returns, by themselves, are also not 
good indicators  of portfolio quality. Fund contributors should be more interested in 
understanding the risk and return profile —something that will allow them to obtain 
better pensions in the future. 
 
15.  Empirical studies suggest that the selection of an optimal portfolio that maximizes 
their  future  pension  is  a  decision  too  complex  for  an  average  individual  to  make. 
Economic behavior literature shows that people have a limited capacity to understand 
phenomena  associated  with  pension  funds  and  the  level  of  financial  literacy  of  the 
average individual, even in the case of the United States, United Kingdom among other 
developed  economies,  is  too  low  to  be  able  to  make  a  proper  portfolio  selection; 
Benartzi and Thaler (2007). Campbell (2006), in turn, shows that people with lower 
incomes  and  less  education  are  more  prone  to  suffer  losses  as  a  result  of  poor 
investment decisions. 
 
16.  Since low financial literacy may impose a heavy tax on lower income people, it is 
imperative for public policy design of pension schemes to  consider this factor. The 
compulsory nature of the pension funds does not imply that individuals understand the 
products  that  are  being  offered.  Therefore,  default  strategies  should  be  offered  to 
individuals in order to ensure that adequate pensions are paid in the future. Experience 
from countries with compulsory savings systems and with default options, like Sweden  
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and  Russia,  suggest  that  effective  demand  from  individuals  for  pension  services  is 
relatively small. In these two countries less than 10 percent of the contributors actively 
select their portfolios; the rest are allocated into the default option.  In both, Sweden and 
Russia,  the  default  option  is  offered  by  state-owned  entities.
4  Recently,  Sweden 
introduced a life cycle framework into the default portfolio in order to encourage better 
pensions for their citizens. This portfolio invests 150 percent of its equity value for 
individuals entering the workforce.
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2.2   Market structure 
 
17.  Still  assuming  that  contributors  are  completely  rational,  the  theoretical  model 
assumes that all desired portfolios are available to them. While funds should comply 
with the personal characteristics of each individual, in practice, the number of portfolios 
offered is relatively limited and contributors encounter a limited number of investment 
options. 
 
18.  As  a  way  to  reduce  inequalities  within  the  same  cohort,  in  particular  those 
generated  by  unscrupulous  managers  of  pension  funds,  or  uninformed  contributors, 
pension fund regulations typically impose short-term performance measurements that 
reduce the risk of deviations  with respect to the average. The minimum guaranteed 
return is an example of such a measure. It is well-known that this type of performance 
tool generates a herding effect among pension fund managers (all managers move in the 
same direction), and therefore their investment portfolios become very similar. 
 
19.  With  a  relatively  limited  range  of  investment  alternatives,  even  in  a  world  of 
extreme  rationality,  it  would  not  be  possible  for  fund  contributors  to  choose  their 
optimal  portfolios.  In  countries  where  fund  managers  may  offer  only  one  type  of 
pension fund, contributors face nearly identical investment alternatives and, therefore, 
there is no major difference among the pension funds selected. In countries with multi-
funds,  like  Chile,  Peru,  Hungary,  and  Estonia,  the  available  investment  alternatives 
essentially coincide with the maximum number of alternatives available in accordance 
with the law, ranging between three to five funds. Funds within the same risk category 
tend  to  be  very  similar.  For  example,  portfolio  funds  classified  as  ―C‖  within  the 
Chilean model tend to appear very similar to each other. 
 
20.  The experiences of countries that have opened up their investments alternatives for 
pension funds to any type of risk have not been entirely successful. In a world with 
limited rationality coupled with fund contributors with little financial knowledge, it is 
very dangerous to open up the range of investments in accordance with the wishes of 
managers. In Lithuania, for example, pension fund managers are allowed to offer as 
many pension funds as they wish. Regulatory requirements are few and are more related 
to transparency and minimum diversification. The case of Lithuania demonstrates that 
comparisons  among  funds  become  extremely  complex  and  that  contributors  are  not 
capable  of  making  an  appropriate  selection.  This  has  led,  for  example,  to  some 
contributors unknowingly choosing high risk funds that were not advertised as such and 
                                                 
4 Perhaps the effective demand is even smaller.  In the case of Russia, approximately 10 percent of 
taxpayers contribute to work-related pension systems, which from the standpoint of the employee; it 
effectively is the default option since it is tied to other labor benefits. 
 
5 This is to say that the fund borrows in order to invest in equities.  
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suffering major losses during the crisis. It has also created a lack of accountability of 
pension fund managers. For example, some funds converted their equity positions into 
fixed income in the middle of the crisis, which resulted in a crystallization of the losses. 
 
2.3  The short-term focus of pension fund managers 
 
21.  Designing  optimal  portfolios  for  pension  fund  contributors  is  not  in  reality  the 
objective  of  pension  fund  management  companies.  The  business  of  pension  fund 
management  companies  is  simply  a  business  of  fees.  Pension  fund  management 
companies manage people's funds in accordance with parameters established by law, 
and  in  exchange  receive  a  fee  that  allows  them  to  generate  income  for  their 
shareholders.
6 Since in some cases optimal portfolio design requires taking high short 
term volatility, pension fund managers may not have the incentive to do so. 
 
22.  Laws typically do not impose on managers the obligation of seeking a portfolio that 
maximizes the welfare of individuals, but they assume —incorrectly— that competition 
will achieve that objective. In particular, recent studies have shown that the model of 
managers with competing portfolios tends to skew asset allocations towards short-term 
portfolios (Basak and Makarov (2009); Castañeda and Rudolph (2010)).  The rationality 
is primarily explained by a manager‘s motivation to be placed at the top of short-term 
returns rankings for the pension funds (for example, prevailing compensation schemes), 
and this objective is achieved with short-term allocations. Consequently, the pension 
funds end up being managed by criteria similar to those of short- and medium-term 
mutual funds. 
 
23.  Samuelson  (1969)  and  Merton  (1969)  demonstrate  that  portfolio  selection  is 
independent of the investment horizon only if the following conditions are present: 
a. Investors have a utility function with constant risk aversion and an intertemporal 
elasticity substitution equal to one; 
b. Asset returns are independent and identically distributed (iid); 
c. Future capital depends on investment returns and not on human capital. 
 
24.  The idea that it is optimal to manage pension fund portfolios simply guided by 
short-term criteria is dismissed due to the strength of these requirements, as the real 
rates  of  return  are  not  constant  over  time,  and  in  the  case  of  pensions,  income  is 
primarily from labor and human capital.  
 
25.  Offering multiple investment alternatives to contributors is insufficient to ensure 
good pensions in the future. The most important advancement of the multi portfolio 
schemes systems compared with systems where pension fund management companies 
offer a single fund systems is that the former allow portfolio compositions with different 
exposures  to  equities.  While  this  allows  contributors  to  eventually  capture  the 
risk/reward  that  equity  offers  in  the  long-term,  it  does  not  offer  a  clear  solution 
indication with respect to a number of the risks of these portfolios. According to Blake 
et al. (1999), Ibbotson and Kaplan (2000), and Iglesias and Walker (2010), strategic 
asset  allocation  explains  more  than  90  percent  of  pension  fund  long  term  returns.  
Allowing the market  to determine strategic asset  allocation  can lead to  sub-optimal 
equilibrium, especially because it does not take into consideration reinvestment risks, 
                                                 
6  There is much debate regarding if the commissions charged for pension funds are reasonable or not, 
however that discussion exceeds the scope of this document.    
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inflation risks, the risk reward, or the mean reversion as does the composition of a 
longer-term portfolio. 
III.   The benevolent planner and long-term portfolios 
 
26.  Since competitive markets are not bringing pension portfolios into the long term 
equilibrium, it is useful to think on how the benevolent planner would solve the long 
term equilibrium, specifically in dealing with market risks; concentration risk; liquidity 
risk; and exchange rate risk. 
 
3.1  Market risks 
 
27.  While  short-term  volatility  can  be  reduced  by  investing  in  short-term  bond 
instruments, these investments generate long term risk for the future pensions. While 
market competition tends to move the equilibrium towards fixed income with short-term 
durations,  theory  indicates  that  for  investors  with  long-term  investment  horizons  it 
would be optimal to invest in longer-term fixed income instruments; Wachter (2003), 
Detemple and Rindisbacher (2010). 
 
28.  While a risk-free asset in short-term portfolios is a short-term Treasury bill note, a 
risk-free asset for a pension fund is a government long-term inflation-indexed bond. 
Nevertheless,  there is  little  incentive for pension funds to  invest  in long-term fixed 
income instruments in competitive frameworks as the evaluation of portfolio managers 
is measured only in terms of short-term returns.  
 
29.  Since the planning horizon for a pension fund is understood to be long-term 
(based  on  contributor‘s  retirement  age),  it  is  optimal  for  pension  funds  to  reduce 
reinvestment  risk  by  maintaining  long-term  government  bonds  in  the  portfolio. 
Investment in these instruments can mitigate the risk of steep drops in real interest rates 
at the time of reinvesting resources. 
 
30.  Pension  funds  would  benefit  from  more  proactive  investment  in  long-term 
inflation  indexed  bonds.  For  example,  as  a  consequence  of  Colombian  economic 
development, the real rates will probably show a marked decline over the next twenty 
years, which should be especially attractive for pension funds with long-term planning 
horizons to lock these relatively high long-term interest rates and transfer those earnings 
to  contributors.  It  is  well  known  that  the  purchasing  power  of  money  changes 
significantly over time and it is essential that funds have instruments which at least 
maintain purchasing power in the long-term. The presence of risk free assets that can 
hedge inflation risks can help to complete the capital market. The supply of long-term 




31.  Since the objective of a ―conservative‖ fund should be to immunize the pension 
before an abrupt change in market conditions, assets in this portfolio should correspond 
to the underlying asset portfolio of a life insurance company that sells annuities at that 
                                                 
7 In the case of Chile, the corporate bond, mortgage and infrastructure markets are developed in real terms 
(indexed to inflation), which allowed investors, including pension funds, to obtain higher returns due to  
increased credit risk in long-term instruments.   
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time. Thus, a sudden rise in long-term interest rates, accompanied by a fall in the value 
of the pension fund is fully hedged by the possibility of buying an annuity with larger 
annuity payments, and consequently, the value of the annuity to be purchased remains 
intact.  Based  on  the  information  available  for  Colombia,  which  is  similar  to  other 
emerging economies, the duration of the fixed income portfolio seems relatively short 
compared with one that can be extracted from a theoretical model. 
 
3.2  Risk premium and international diversification 
 
31.  Empirical evidence shows that it is possible to capture a risk premium through 
investment in well diversified portfolios of equities. The classic works of Fama and 
French (1988, 2002) found evidence that a risk premium exists, but it is only possible to 
capture it in the long-term. More recent estimations [Dimson et al. (2006)] suggest that 
the risk premium should be about 4.5 percent compared with short-term instruments. 
 
32.  Pension funds can capture risk premium by investing in equity instruments in a 
―consistent‖ manner. The equity strategy of pension funds should be one of the best 
selected parameters within the portfolio strategy, and therefore, it has to be consistent 
over time.  Pension funds should not alter their equity exposure before there are changes 
in the condition of the market.  It is surprising that in many countries the exposure to 
equity in pension funds has had substantial fluctuations since 2007, motivated not only 
because of the fall in the equity prices, but also by managerial decisions to reduce the 
equity exposure in the middle of the crisis. 
 
33.  The optimal equity investment strategy is that of an internationally diversified 
portfolio.  In countries with underdeveloped capital markets, pension funds typically 
begin investing in equities in local markets and quickly become the most important 
institutional investor in the country.  While this supports local market development, 
price behavior becomes endogenous to pension fund investment decisions.  After some 
time,  and  unless  other  institutional  investors  appear  on  the  market,  pension  funds 
become trapped with those securities and unable to sell them without affecting their 
price.  In  this  narrow  equilibrium,  the  only  strategy  that  supports  the  value  of  the 
pension fund is to buy more of the same assets, which creates the condition for a market 
bubble. 
 
34.  Pension funds can feed asset price bubbles, which are not easy to escape.  For 
example,  in  the  second  half  of  the  1990s,  Chilean  pension  funds  accumulated  a 
significant proportion of the equity float available on the market.  Given the investment 
restrictions, they had no choice but to continue investing in these local instruments.  The 
situation was ―saved‖ by the arrival of Spanish groups  which took  control of these 
companies,  the  majority  belonging  to  the  services  sector  (electricity  and  telephone 
communications).  Pension funds in other countries, including Bulgaria in 2007, have 
helped to feed these domestic asset price bubbles, without a clear exit strategy. 
 
35.  Diversification  into  international  markets  should  happen  during  the  early 
developmental stages  of  local  markets.  However, if left  to  the market,  international 
diversification  is  likely  emerge  too  late  in  the  process,  probably  once  the  domestic 
prices are too high and pension fund are heavily invested in domestic equities. While 
the returns on asset prices in local markets are higher than those of international ones, 
pension funds have little incentive to invest abroad.  This is a relatively short-sighted 
vision  in  reality,  because  while  pension  funds  are  what  feed  domestic  prices,  it  
11 
 
constitutes an extremely fragile balance.  Consequently, pension funds can access the 
risk reward as long as it happens through the international diversification of their equity 
portfolios. 
 
3.3   Liquidity risk 
 
36.  In  pension  systems  where  competition  determines  reference  portfolios  (e.g. 
average return of the industry), managers have the incentive to use liquid assets in order 
to facilitate trading.  However, from a long-term perspective, this strategy may end up 
being sub-optimal since the resulting cost is imposed on beneficiaries, who should be 
more interested in achieving a return on assets over the long-term. Since more than 90 
percent of pension fund returns are explained by strategic allocation, focusing pension 
fund investments strategies on short-term trading is counterproductive. 
 
37.  Since they are long-term investors by nature, pension funds should be interested 
in capturing the liquidity premium by investing part of the portfolio in low liquidity 
instruments.   While this is  a strategy pursued by  some pension funds in  developed 
countries (for example, TIAA CREF and ATP), in pension fund models, such as those 
in Chile, Peru, and Colombia, illiquid instruments become unattractive. 
 
38.  While there is value in investing in illiquid instruments there are also risks of 
illiquid  assets  that  need  to  be  appropriately  measured.    Since  valuation  is  a  major 
concern in illiquid markets, investment regulations tend to be reluctant to accept these 
instruments.  Aside  from  the  valuation  problems,  and  since  disclosure  of  illiquid 
instruments is usually lower compared to public companies, investments with related 
parties  becomes  an  issue  of  concern.    Therefore,  regulation  should  be  careful  in 
allowing these types of investments, and in particular avoiding transactions with related 
parties,  or  where  there  is  interest  on  behalf  of  the  controller  of  the  fund  manager.  
Additionally,  the  feasibility  of  investing  in  instruments  of  low  liquidity  should  be 
supported by the institutional framework that ensures fair valuation schemes. 
 
3.4  Exchange rate risks 
 
39.  An important decision for investors who invest in foreign currency assets is to 
decide  how  much  of  the  exchange  exposure  to  cover  in  the  portfolio.    While  the 
majority of institutional investors tend to cover the entire exchange rate exposure, this 
practice is only optimal if the foreign equity returns are not correlated with the foreign 
currency returns. 
 
40.  Campbell et al. (2010) found that reserve currencies (U.S. Dollar, Euro, and 
Swiss Franc) tend to be negatively correlated with the returns in global capital markets: 
these hard currencies tend to appreciate when global markets fall and depreciate when 
global  capital  markets  increase.    This  indicates  that  investors  seeking  to  minimize 
currency risk in their portfolios should not cover their currency exposure. 
 
41.  Chile‘s experience helps to illustrate this problem.  Prior to the crisis, and purely 
from a short-term perspective, pension funds had an incentive to be covered by the 
dollar because if markets were rising, the Chilean peso had a tendency to appreciate. If 
they had not covered themselves, a portfolio in pesos would have had a lower return the 
following month than that of an identical portfolio but covered by exchange exposure.  
During the crisis, the value of international assets fell nearly 40 percent, but the peso  
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depreciated against the dollar to a slightly lesser extent.  While the majority of funds 
were hedged against losses during that period, if they had taken uncovered positions 
against the dollar the losses would have been minimal. 
 
42.  While  naked  investment  operations  in  foreign  securities  (unhedged  currency 
exposures) by the pension funds serve as a natural currency hedge in export economies, 
with increasingly severe problems of currency appreciation, the use of currency hedges 
by  pension  funds  neutralizes  this  effect  and  it  can  even  create  the  opposite  effect.  
Colombia, like other developing countries, is exposed to short-term capital flows and 
massive revenues from the export sector that tend to generate sustained appreciation 
trends in the peso.  Since pension funds are dominant market players in small capital 
markets  like  in  Colombia,  pension  fund  currency  operations  have  an  effect  on  the 
exchange rate.  While investment abroad by pension funds leads to a liquidation of 
pesos and a purchase of dollars in the international market, the use of hedges neutralizes 
this  effect  since  the  banks  that  grant  coverage  must  liquidate  dollars  in  the  local 
market.
8  Therefore, from the macroeconomic point of view it makes sense for pension 
funds to keep their exposures in hard currencies unhedged.
9 
 
43.  From this section it can be concluded that in the absence of benchmarks that may 
guide investment decisions into long-term results, pension funds will behave as short-
term mutual funds.   
IV.  Aligning the interests of pension fund managers with those of the 
contributors 
 
44.  The backbone of the concept of fiduciary responsibility is the capacity of the 
courts to provide meaningful interpretations of this concept. In countries with common 
law,  like  England  and  the  United  States,  the  concept  of  fiduciary  responsibility  is 
meaningful and powerful concept, basically because both supervisors and courts can 
enforce  that  duty.    In  countries  with  a  civil  code  instead,  the  concept  of  fiduciary 
responsibility is not tangible and it is very difficult for both supervisors and judicial 
courts to enforce these duties without a law that describes exactly what is meant by the 
concept.  Additionally, the difference between cases in England and the United States 
and those in countries with civil codes like Colombia is that courts are not prepared to 
debate these issues.  Beyond the arguments that can be presented in court, judges tend to 
decide according to criteria that reflect purely and exclusively the letter of the Law.  To 
illustrate this point, consider a pension fund in Colombia that invests half of its assets in 
equities  in  medium-sized  enterprises  in  the  Caribbean.  Even  an  unsophisticated 
understanding of asset management would point to this as being a high risk strategy and 
not a rational investment (irresponsible from a fiduciary perspective) for a pension fund.  
If the companies are destroyed and the assets become worthless and action is taken 
against the manager, a common law court is likely to look at the actions of the manager 
in making the investment against what is in the best interests of the contributors.  By 
contrast in a system based on the civil code, a court is likely to be interested in whether 
                                                 
8 In the Chilean case, Cowan et al. (2007) find a significant effect between pension fund investments 
abroad with exchange rate depreciation. 
 
9 Unless new evidence becomes available, currency exposures to emerging market currencies should be 
hedged against a hard currency (e.g. Dollar, Euro).    
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the  investments  were  made  within  the  limits  permitted  under  the  regulations.    In 
countries where the concept of fiduciary responsibility has not been well developed, 
investment regulations should remain relatively prescriptive. 
 
45.  Although it is necessary to have good investment regulations, they might not be 
sufficient to ensure that funds are invested in a manner consistent with the long-term 
objectives  of  contributors.      Investment  regulations  normally  prescribe  those  asset 
classes in which a pension fund can invest and are silent about the construction of an 
optimal portfolio.  As markets develop, the latitude that regulation grants is so wide that 
pension funds may move into sub-optimal portfolios, undetected.  
 
46.  In  most  emerging  countries  that  have  created  2
nd  pillars,  the  structure  of 
investment limits has not followed portfolio risk logic. In countries that are starting their 
pension reforms, typically with tiny capital markets and due to the limited availability 
of  instruments  (deposits,  securities,  and  short-term  Treasury  bills),  the  investment 
regulation  for  pension  funds  is  relatively  simple.    When  markets  become  more 
sophisticated and  begin developing other types of instruments, including mutual funds, 
investment  fund  shares,  derivatives,  securitized  instruments,  etc.  it  becomes  more 
complex to determine which investment limits are applicable to each instrument. 
 
47.  In practice, investment regulations have tended to validate the presence of new 
instruments in the market and have allowed pension funds to keep investing ―little by 
little‖ in more sophisticated instruments, under the assumption that the investments are 
secure as long as there are not dramatic price corrections.  Based on the experience of 
Chile (before the legislative changes in 2008), it is possible to argue that the latitude 
granted for these instruments is far from having any economic or financial rationality of 
risk, and the investment liberalization process has followed a gradual approach of the 
validation of availability of instruments. 
 
4.1  International experience 
 
48.  Due to a multiplicity of factors that explain an optimal portfolio, it is expected 
that investment regulation are different among countries. The most important are the 
following: 
 
a.  Existence of other sources of retirement income 
 
49.  While in some countries like Chile and Colombia, all pension income comes 
from a mandatory capitalization system, other countries like Poland and Lithuania count 
on a first pillar system that allows them to ensure an income independent of what the 
individual capitalization system yields.
10 Thus, investment regulation in countries with a 
first  pillar  system  should  be  relatively  more  flexible  than in  countries  where  the 
pensions depend exclusively on the second pillar. 
 
b.  Supervisory approach 
 
50.  In  supervisory  approaches  that  are  compliance  based,  the  responsibility  of 
managers is to comply with the limits established in the law and regulations.  However, 
in risk based supervision frameworks, managers have to prove that they have adequate 
                                                 
10 In 2008 Chile introduced a solidarity pillar that mitigates the risk of poverty for pensioners.  
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capacity to manage risks before being able to invest in a specific asset class.  Thus, 
investment regulations in systems with compliance based supervision should be much 
stricter than those where the approach is risk based.  
 
c.  The degree of development of the domestic capital market 
 
51.  In countries with relatively developed financial markets, the domestic capital 
market is capable of absorbing pension fund investments without a significant effect on 
asset prices, while in countries with small capital markets, pension fund investments can 
have  a  significant  impact  on  domestic  asset  prices  and  therefore  create  speculative 
spirals. The experience in Latin America and Central Europe shows that in countries 
with  small  capital  markets,  the  size  of  the  pension  funds  is  likely  to  outgrow  the 
availability of instruments in the capital market in the first decade after the reform. 
Thus, in order to avoid asset prices bubble, the investment regulation of pension funds 
in small capital markets should be stricter than in countries with deeper markets. 
 
d.  Contribution rate 
 
52.  All other things equal and assuming that individuals are trying to reach a certain 
replacement rate, investment regulation in countries with higher contribution rates have 
less pressure on the risk of the portfolio compared with those with lower contribution 
rates.  In incipient markets, regulation should also be mindful  of the stability of the 
demand for public bonds. Pension funds play an important role as buy and holders of 
government instruments. 
 
4.2  Comparative analysis 
 
53.  As described in  the previous section,  investment  regulations across countries 
may target different risk profiles.  As seen in Figure 1, risks profiles embedded in the 
investment limits of different countries tend to be diverse.  In the most aggressive fund 
in Mexico, an investment of up to 30 percent in equity instruments is permitted, while 


















                                                 
11 Funded pension funds were nationalized in 2011  
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    Figure 1:  Equity Investment Limits in Countries with Second Pillars, 2009 
 
Source:  World Bank 
 
54.  One element that requires consideration is that the majority of the investment 
regulations have moved towards limits without minimum thresholds.  Until its recent 
nationalization,  Hungary  was  probably  the  only  system  that  required  minimum 
investment limits.  In Chile there were thresholds for investments in equities in the past, 
but these were replaced by an approach which requires the most conservative funds 
always to have less equity than the most aggressive ones.  This change is due to the fact 
that in the previous legislation there was the possibility that a risky fund might have less 
equity than a conservative fund.  Slovakia also requires more conservative funds to have 
less equity than riskier funds. 
 
55.  By not imposing limits on equities, the market is left to decide the exposure to 
that asset class, which in no case ensures optimal allocation.  For example, in the case of 
Slovakia, balanced and aggressive funds are allowed to be invested in equities up to 50 
and 80 percent, respectively.  However, in 2006 the actual allocation amounts were only 
6 and 8 percent for the balanced and aggressive funds respectively.  In 2009 the actual 
equity participation in the portfolios was further reduced to approximately 1 percent of 
the total assets. Since then, differences among the three types of funds are negligible. 
 
56.  The imposition of minimum thresholds for certain asset classes requires a clear 
understanding of depth of the market, the pension system risks, from the regulatory 
authority that many countries are not willing to assume.  If the regulatory authority does 
not have a clear expectation of pension system risks, it is even more unlikely that the 
contributors may have one.   In the absence of a minimum investment thresholds for 
certain asset classes, portfolio allocations that might emerge from the mere imposition 
of a ceiling can be very varied.  In addition, this can lead to erratic allocations in the 
behavior of equity allocations, which might not be related to the strategic positions, and 
which are very difficult to justify not only from an optimality point of view.  Perhaps 
the only advantage in avoiding the imposition of lower limits is to give the feeling of 
less intervention.  
Equity Investment Limits in Second Pillar Pension Systems
(% of  Total Assets)




























V.  Structure of investment limits in the Colombian pension system  
 
5.1  Limits with related parties and conflicts of interest 
 
57.   Financial infrastructure and transparency are necessary conditions in order to 
prevent misappropriation of fund assets.  In this sense, the separation of the role of the 
pension fund manager from that of the fund has played an important role in the security 
of the contributions.  Additionally, the presence of independent custodians has been 
essential to protect the ownership of the funds. High levels of transparency and the 
existence of a specialized supervisory authority have also  played important  roles  in 
ensuring that managers are responsible for managing third-party resources.  
 
58.   However, transparency is not a sufficient condition for aligning the incentives 
of pension funds with those of the pension fund management company. Limits with 
related parties are a controversial issue which goes to the heart of the alignment of 
interests of the manager and the contributor.  To the extent that managers are allowed to 
invest  part  of  the  fund  in  companies  related  to  the  controller,  they  are  serving 
shareholder interests and not necessarily contributor interests.  In developing countries 
with small capital markets, it is common to find that the controllers of pension fund 
managers  are  also  controllers  of  companies  in  the  real  sector  of  the  country,  and 
surprisingly investment regulation tends to validate these conflicts.  With the strong 
competition for market share from international financial groups, it is hard to justify 
regulations that favor the presence of local groups in the ownership of pension fund 
management  companies  and  consequently  face  serious  conflicts  of  interests  when 
making their investment decisions.  
 
59.   The  relationship  between  pension  fund  managers  and  economic  groups 
belonging  to  the  same  controller  becomes  a  sensitive  factor  to  the  extent  that  the 
controller has the incentives to use pension funds to finance its own operations.  In 
countries where legislation regarding related party transactions is relatively formal and 
does not extend to indirect ownership relationships, this phenomenon happens more 
frequently.  It generates, therefore, an unfair competition with other participants and a 
wider disconnection with the objectives of the contributors, as investment decisions are 
more guided by the interests of the controller than the ones from the contributors. 
 
60.  In the case of financial groups, it is also risky when pension funds begin to 
operate in conjunction with a bank or any another financial entity of the controller.  For 
example, it is common to encounter cases in which group brokerage launches a bond 
and  at  the  same  time  one  of  the  largest  buyers  of  the  bond  is  the  pension  fund 
management  company  within  the  group  using  the  pension  fund.    Another  common 
example is when the bank in the financial group manages the short-term assets of the 
pension fund.  This situation typically happens when the bank CFO, or some of his or 
her associates, is also member of the board of the pension fund management company.  
Although  international  diversification  in  instruments  where  the  financial  group  has 
some  interest  has  lower  risk  through  greater  diversification,  it  is  risky  from  the 
perspective that pension fund investment can be used for financing risky operations of 




61.  Detecting transactions  with  related parties  and initiating investigations in  the 
local  markets  become  more  complex  once  pension  funds  invest  internationally.  For 
example, in 2003 Telefonica Chile, a publicly traded company, controlled by Telefonica 
(Spain) decided to split the mobile business from the rest of the telecom business, and to 
buying the minority shareholders out of the mobile business. The transaction requested 
to be voted at the shareholders assembly, and the vote of the majority of pension funds 
was essential for its approval. While the pension funds did not have a common view 
about the price of the transaction, the vote of Provida, the largest pension fund in Chile, 
was necessary for completing the transaction. BBVA was the controller of Provida, and 
also  (at  that  time)  the  main  shareholder  of  Telefonica-Spain.  With  the  support  of 
Provida, the (controversial) transaction was completed. BBVA (Spain) and Telefonica 
(Spain) simultaneously decided to initiate a joint venture for exploring the possibilities 
of mobile banking in some Latin American countries.  This specific transaction was 
decided by the board of directors (mostly represented by BBVA executives) of Provida 
and not by the Provida‘s investment manager, as all other transactions.  Despite the 
controversy in the specialized press, the Chilean pension supervisor did nothing about 
it.  The cost of initiating such investigation would have costly for the supervisor, and the 
probability of getting something concrete was minimal, as most of the decisions were 
taken  outside  the  Chilean  frontiers.  Despite  the  ―good  story,‖  it  would  have  been 
difficult to prove any wrongdoing by Provida and its shareholders. Finally, Chilean 
courts would have been unable to get into the substance of the transaction. 
 
62.  Two solutions might be proposed for addressing this problem, but both involve 
reducing the investment limit of related parties to zero.  The first alternative consists of 
raising the requirements to be a pension fund manager, such as requiring managers to 
renew their license under higher operation standards.  The second option is to require 
that the majority of directors of pension fund managers be independent directors, not 
only from the perspective of holding other positions within the group but also from 
having any business relationship with the group or any personal relationship with the 
main shareholders. 
 
63.  The introduction of contributors in the decision making of pension fund has not 
worked as a mechanism for improving performance of pension funds. The experience of 
Hungary  demonstrates  that  it  is  neither  realistic  nor  efficient  to  try  to  incorporate 
contributors into the investment decision-making process.  Evidence suggests that the 
incorporation  of  contributors  into  management  decisions  of  the  pension  funds  has 
resulted in practice, in formal ceremonies that contributed little to nothing to improving 
the pension system.  As an anecdote, pension funds have had difficulty in filling the 
participation quorums required by law in the assembly, and typically only employees of 
the management company are those who actually show up at such meetings.  Assuming 
that contributors are interested in what is happening with pension funds and that they 
have  the  capacity  to  provide  meaningful  inputs  to  each  pension  fund  management 
company are not realistic assumptions.  Finally, organizing contributors so that they 
might  become  more  involved  in  the  decisions  of  the  pension  fund  can  be  very 
expensive, and with an unclear outcome. 
 
5.2  Structural limits 
 
64.  For an economy like Colombia, the regulation should basically establish four 
investment limits.  Other existing limits may be substituted by improvement in the risk 
management  requirements  of  the  pension  fund  management  company.  While  in  a  
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compliance based supervision scheme, it is necessary to establish issuer limits, issuance 
limits,  and  concentration  limits  in  order  to  keep  managers  from  taking  unnecessary 
risks, in a risk based supervision approach, with exception of limits with related parties, 
the pension fund manager should design strategies to mitigate those risks through their 
risk  management  process  or  the  internal  investment  guidelines  of  the  fund.  The 
convenience of introducing additional limits in Colombia would depend on the speed of 
progress in the areas of supervision. 
 
a.  Equities 
 
65.  Equity investments in the life cycle context are very important consideration as 
the quantum in the portfolio varies according to the contributor‘s age. Limits on these 
parameters must be defined as precisely as possible, including  maxima and minima 
without any overlap between collars. These collars or bands (among which should be 
investment in equities) hopefully need to be designed according to models of long-term 
optimization. 
 
66.  Unless the use of a benchmark portfolio is imposed, it is insufficient to impose only 
maximum  limits  in  equities,  since  the  market  equilibrium  can  lead  to  situations  of 
severe  underweight  in  equity  exposure,  which  may  result  in  low  levels  of  future 
pensions.
12  In a rules-based system, it is necessary to have limits on foreign and local 
equity, while in monitoring systems based on risk, it is sufficient to have  a single limit 
for equities. By not having limits on local equity exposure, the system runs the risk of 
organic growth of pension funds overtaking the growth in the market which creates an 
equity asset price bubble, as described above.  In the case of risk-based supervision, risk 
management models should consider such types of risk.   
 
b.    Currencies 
 
67.  Where pension funds invest overseas and the securities are denominated in either US 
dollars or in Euros, these positions should not be hedged.  If pension funds invest in overseas 
securities denominated in other currencies, hedging should be permitted but limited to hedging 
the position against the US dollar or the Euro.   Hedging is a complex issue which needs to be 
the subject of a comprehensive regulation.  Where a futures market exists, hedging should be 
done in this market; otherwise in the forwards market by installments, for which there is 
greater liquidity.  For example, if pension funds have exposure to the Brazilian Real, the 
coverage of Reales to dollars can be done in futures markets.
13 
 
c.    Government bonds 
 
68.  Pension funds are expected to hold investments in risk-free assets.  Since the 
maximum  government  bond  exposure  in  Colombia  is  an  issue  stipulated  by  law, 
emphasis in the regulation should be focused on the duration of such assets.  Regulation 
may establish a minimum limit for the duration depending on the type of fund.  Thus, 
riskier  funds  should  require  a  longer  duration  in  government  bonds  than  more 
conservative ones. Limits in this area should be subject to the availability of instruments 
                                                 
12 In the case of Slovakia, which was illustrated in the previous section, in spite of relatively high limits 
established by law, equity investment is less than 1 percent. 
13 See Viceira (2010), Campbell,  Serfaty-de Medeiros,Viceira (2010),  and Walker (2008)  
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on  the  market,  and  the  government  should  play  a  proactive  role  in  supplying 





Box 1:  Coverage for Minimum Wage Increases 
Since it creates sizable price distortions in the pricing of annuities, the inability to 
provide hedge against minimum wage risk is one of the major challenges that the 
Colombian private pension system.  Life insurance companies (CSVs) are reluctant 
to sell annuities to people who receive a pension up to one and half times their 
minimum wage by way of an annuity because of the risk of triggering the minimum 
pension at some point in the future.  At the same time, annuities for people with 
slightly  higher  funds  are  severely  discounted  and  individuals  end  up  receiving 
pensions close to minimum wage because the CSVs do not have instruments to 
cover the risk of this variable increasing. 
The lack of instruments to cover the risk of minimum wages increases the poverty 
level at old age. The lack of this instrument is equivalent to imposing a regressive 
tax,  which  can  reach  up  to  50  percent  of  the  value  of  the  asset  pension  for 
individuals with low income.. People who expect to receive three or more minimum 
wages receive fairer pensions because the risk of triggering a minimum pension in 
low. 
This  paper  proposes  a  mechanism  for  the  government  to  internalize  the  costs 
generated  by  increases  in  minimum  wages.    Under  the  current  framework,  the 
impact of the fiscal budget of increases in minimum wage is relatively modest,
 14  so 
governments may find it relatively inexpensive to increase minimum  wages.   In 
order  to  align  incentives,  the  government  with  the  rest  of  the  society,  the 
government should pay a cost of raising the minimum wage.  This can be achieved 
via the options market.  
The government can address this problem by issuing long-term inflation indexed 
bonds, but at the same time, have an option attached to these instruments that pays 
the maximum between inflation and the minimum wage.  In this manner, various 
objectives  are  achieved  simultaneously.    First,  life  insurance  companies  begin 
paying fairer pensions and they have an incentive to sell annuities to people with 
lower incomes.  Second, the government begins to take a cautious position with 
respect to future increases in minimum wage, since there are permanent effects on 
the budget.
  15   Next, it allows a robust and strong demand for long-term inflation 
indexed government bonds, without the need of segmenting the capital market.
  16  
Finally, it allows the government to refinance their public debt in a long horizon.  It 
is important to highlight that the provision of this type of instrument requires the 
development of expertise in the Ministry of Finance in option valuation. 
   
                                                 
14 In the majority of the countries, a high quantity of fiscal employees receives remuneration significantly 
higher than the minimum salary.   
15 An increase of 1 percent of the minimum wage above the value of inflation in the first year, with a 20 
year bond generates a difference in value of about 22 percent.  
16 The alternative to issuing bonds indexed to mini mum wage is less efficient because  it generates an 
additional  segmentation  between  nominal  bonds,  inflation -indexed  bonds,  and   bonds  indexed  to 




d.  Catastrophic risk 
 
69.  Pension funds may want to avoid the risk of losses during a given period through 
the use of stop loss instruments.  Derivatives are a powerful instrument to mitigate these 
risks. Regulation may provide guidance on the type of instruments that can be used to 
hedge catastrophic risks. 
 
VI.  The long-term portfolio and the optimization process 
 
70.   In  the  context  of  portfolio  management,  strategic  asset  allocation  (SAA) 
represents the materialization of the investment objectives of the individual investor, 
and is expressed by the allocation of funds available for investment into the different 
asset classes, according to the stipulations of the management contract. 
 
71.  Naturally, the allocation in question should be compatible with restrictions from 
the  management  contract  (for  example,  investment  limitations  in  certain,  specific 
assets), and with the prevailing conditions in the market (e.g., expected returns and 
volatility of assets on the market, etc.). See Maggin et al. (2007). 
 
72.  In the specific case of pension funds, the definition of the SAA is a matter of 
highest importance, as recent evidence has shown that this is responsible for a large 
percentage  of  the  variability  of  returns  earned  by  investors,  including  pension  fund 




73.  The  above-mentioned  point  is  especially  important  when  pension  funds  are 
operating in countries with a DC pension system, since the SAA definition involves 
aspects that relate not only to the mandate or the prevailing conditions in the securities 
markets, but also to those related to the life cycle stage of the contributor.  In this 
respect, financial literature points out that the optimal SAA of a pension fund should 
consider the life cycle strategy of individuals (Bodie et al. (1992)). 
 
74.  Alternative models, such as the ―no lose‖ suggested by Feldstein (2005) and 
tested  by  Poterba  et  al.  (2006)  for  the  American  economy  are  difficult  to  test  in 
economies  with  incomplete  fixed  income  markets  like  Colombia.  Unlike  life  cycle 
models, no lose models are not derived from optimization models and are intensive in 
data availability, since the amount of equity depends on the historical return of long-
term, inflation-indexed bond curve and by equity returns.  The lack of an inflation-




                                                 
17 The studies by Brinson et al. and Blake et al. found that more than 90 percent of the variability in 
returns obtained by investors over time is explained by the SAA, while Ibbotson and Kaplan found that 
the SAA explains over 40 percent of the variability of returns among fund managers.  
 
18 The lack of data leads to completely deterministic predictions.  
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75.  Life cycle models are based on the assumption that the wealth of younger people 
is primarily determined by human capital (that is, the present value of wages they will 
receive as a product of their work).  Under this assumption, if the individuals profiles 
are such that their risk-return preferences imply that they wish to maintain a percentage 
of their total wealth (i.e., human capital plus financial wealth) invested in risky assets 
(like stocks, or long-term bonds),
19 the optimal SAA will crucially depend on the human 
capital characteristics of the individual. Although there are differences among human 
capital profiles that may justify different portfolio allocations, there is also room for 
grouping individuals with slightly different profiles.  
 
76.  For example, if human capital is similar to an investment in bank deposits,
20 then 
the SAA will be such as to allocate a percentage of              
    of financial wealth 
of risky assets, where    
   corresponds to the fraction representing human capital within 
the financial wealth at the moment  .  This result basically explains that by noticing if 
the  individual  in  question  wishes  to  maintain      of  their  total  wealth  invested  in 
stocks, and a fraction    
   of their financial wealth is indirectly invested in deposits, it 
therefore requires  an  increased stock investment  of      




77.  Figure 2 illustrates this classic result for the expected trajectory of returns.  The 
figure  was  constructed  based  on  a  simplified  version  of  the  model  developed  in 
Appendix A (with two assets:  equity and fixed income instruments) and takes into 
account the particularities of the Colombian context:  a risk premium of 4.5 percent 
(consistent with the MSCI World Emerging Markets), a risk aversion coefficient of 2.5 
(consistent with a conservative approach
22), and an individual who at the age of 20 
receives a monthly remuneration equivalent to 0.5 minimum wages, which subsequently 
evolves according to the investment profile documented by Viceira (2010, pg. 223) for 
Chile, with an average between 1 and 2 minimum wages throughout his/her working 
life, which is consistent with the reality of the pension system in Colombia. 
 
   
                                                 
19 The assumptions necessary to justify the indicated characterization can be found in Appendix A, or 
alternatively, in Merton (1969).  In short, what is required is that the individual has preferences (expected 
utility) with constant, relative risk aversion and a set of investment opportunities (expected return, short-
term interest rate and market volatility) that remains constant over time. 
20 Assumption that is consistent with the low correlation (close to zero) between wages and stock returns 
[Cocco et al. (2005, pg. 500), Viceira (2010)], although Campbell (1996) argues otherwise. 
21 For more clarity, note the total wealth given by:    
          
      
  , from where you have    
   
        
     . 
22 A coefficient of relative risk aversion of 2.5 implies that the individual will be indifferent between 
entering a fair bet where they can increase or decrease their wealth by  ±50%  and surely lose 30% of 
their current wealth.  
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  Figure 2: Optimal portfolio profile 
 
Source: Authors‘ own calculations. 
 
The  profile  illustrated  in  the  figure  shows  that  the  expected  trajectory  of  equity 
instruments (and other risky assets) is decreasing throughout the individuals‘ life cycle, 
which is  explained by the decrease of     
   as  the  individual ages  and their human 
capital depreciates. At the end, when the latter has fully depreciated, investment in risky 
assets reaches precisely    of financial wealth (and at these levels equals total wealth) 
of the individual. Please note that for the parameters employed       ; that is to say 
that at the end of the investment horizon the individual wishes to maintain an exposure 
of 40 percent in stocks.  This result assumes, however, that the individual's risk aversion 
remains  constant  throughout  their  lifetime,  which  is  not  evident  in  the  case  of  an 
individual who is completely dependent on their pension savings.  In particular, if the 
coefficient of risk aversion is duplicated as the individual ages, the inverted fraction 
invested in risky assets would be reduced by half (which is,        if      ). 
 
78.  This paper makes references to this result as the ―base case,‖ and utilizes it as a 
point of reference to analyze and evaluate relevant factors in a defined contribution 
pension system that could alter or modify its outcome. 
 
6.1  Analysis based on a parametric model 
 
79.  In order to motivate the analysis of principal elements affecting the outcome of 
the base case, this section presents a summary of a portfolio selection model developed 
in Appendix A. 
 
80.  The model is part of the tradition of portfolio selection models from Merton 
(1969, 1971) and Samuelson (1969), including more recent advancements [Detemple et 
al.  (2003,  2005),  Detemple  and  Rindisbacher  (2010)]  and  is  comprised  of  three 
dimensions: 
  pension system investment objectives  
  restrictions surrounding its operation, and 




81.  In terms of the objectives of the pension system, the model adopts the premise 
that  these  are  given  by  the  objective  of  maximizing  the  representative  individual‘s 
welfare (which is directly related to the pension amount that they will receive after 
retirement), and additionally, by guaranteeing a minimal level of income during the 
inactive stage of the life cycle.   
 
82.  To this end, the algebraic description of the problem considers as argument of 
the objective function (of the expected utility type) the pension that the individual is 
capable of financing, instead of a simple terminal value of the individual account at the 
moment of pension: 
 
                                
 
where      corresponds to the mathematical expectation,       is a discount factor, 
             is a function of instantaneous, increasing, concave utility, that has the 
amount of the pension possible to finance (     ) as the argument, which depends on 
the accumulated amount in the individual account (      ) and the unitary price of 
annuities upon retirement (      ).  Additionally, the objective function considers the 
fraction  (         )  of  minimum  wage  at  the  time  of  the  pension  (       ),  as  the 
minimal pension level. 
 
83.  The above-mentioned objective function permits the SAA to consider the need 
to cover adverse fluctuations in the factors that influence the price of annuity (      ), 
hereby  avoiding  the  occurrence  of  a  disconnection  between  the  performance  of  the 
pension fund and the pension that the individual will receive at the time of retirement.  
Additionally,  this  function  also  considers  the  fiscal  interest  as  an  incentive  for  the 
accumulation  of  sufficient  funds  for  financing,  at  least,  a  fraction  (         )  of 
minimum wage (       ), and imposes a penalty in the case this does not happen (since: 
         , for      , with      ).  
 
84.  In  addition,  the  considered  investment  restrictions  are  taken  into  account  by 
setting the admissible investment rule as                  where     is the percentage of 
the pension fund invested in  the asset class            ,  at  the moment          , 
while     and     correspond to the lower and higher investment limits, respectively, for 
that asset class. 
 
85.  Finally, investment opportunities available to pension funds were characterized 
by a set of       asset classes. 
 
6.2  Specific considerations 
 
86.  Based  on  the  parametric  model  description,  we  discuss  five  aspects  that 
influence the result of the base case: 
 
a.  relationship with ‗efficiency‘ in the sense of mean-variance; 
b.  effects of human capital characteristics in strategic asset allocation; 
c.  effects of considering minimum pension objectives; 
d.  effects of parameter uncertainty; and  




First, it is worth noticing that when an individual's total wealth comes entirely from 
their  financial  wealth  (that  is,  that  human  capital  is  equal  to  zero)  the  base  case 
recommends investing     in stocks. However, Merton (1969) shows that in the case 
with  two  assets  (for  example,  stocks  and  fixed  income  instruments)  and  constant 
investment opportunities over time, this percentage simply corresponds to            
    here       is the relative risk aversion coefficient,       is the volatility of the 
risky asset and           is the market risk reward (with       as the expected stock 
return and   is the interest rate of a bank a                      which,     urn, 
yields an identical solution (interior)    the problem of short-term mean-variance: 
  
                                      , 
 
which  corresponds  to  one  of  the possible  specifications  of  the  problem  studied  by 
Markowitz. 
 
87.  Consequently, the recommendation from the base case (that is ―[…] to invest a 
decreasing amount over time in volatile assets […]‖) can be understood as an extension 
of the result of mean-variance efficiency by Markowitz, for the case where the portfolio 
selection is dynamic and is carried throughout the life cycle of the individual, which 
considers variations in the financial situation of the individual. 
 
88.  Naturally,  since  both  are  complementary  results,  the  base  case  shares  the 
intuition and spirit of the classic result by Markowitz, but also its  shortcomings. In 
particular, the instability of the results when faced with parameter uncertainty (e.g., 
expected returns, elements of the variance-covariance matrix, etc.); Rachev et al. (2008, 
pg. 247). 
 
89.  Additionally, when the data generating process of asset returns vary over time, it 
is possible to show that Markowitz's recommendation is modified in favor of a solution 
that  contains  time-varying  hedging  demands,  that  reflects  the  ability  of  long-term 
investors to anticipate (or cover) the adverse fluctuations in the investment opportunity 
set; Merton (1971, 1973).  This is the case, for example, when the stock returns exhibit 
mean reversion; Kim and Omberg (1996), Campbell and Viceira (1999, 2001).  
 
90.  An important corollary that branches from this last point is that, in the presence 
of  a  time-varying  investment  opportunity  set  (mean  reversion  of  returns,  variable 
volatility, etc.), the optimal SAA fails to be (static) mean-variance efficient. Hence, 
evidence  suggesting  the  ―inefficiency‖  (in  the  mean-variance  sense)  of  long-term 
pension  fund  portfolios  does  not  imply  the  presence  of  a  sub-optimal  investment 
portfolio, but rather the complete opposite, if you look at it from a long-term investment 
horizon point of view. 
 
91.  Second, it is worth recalling that when the contemporary correlation between 
human  capital  returns  and  the  stock  market  is  low  (assuming  from  the  base  case 
scenario),  human  capital  is  comparable  to  an  indirect  investment  in  fixed  income 
instruments, so that the financial investment in assets increases by      
   in order to 
achieve the combination between stocks and the desired fixed income.  However, there 
are  reasons  that  suggest  that  human  capital  can  be  linked  to  an  investment  with  a 




92.  One example is the relationship that exists between a sharp fall (rise) of the stock 
indices  that  precedes  a  subsequent  increase  (decrease)  of  unemployment  in  the 
economy;  Stock  and  Walson  (2003).    This  fact  can  be  understood  as  a  positive 
correlation (not necessarily contemporary) between stock returns and returns of human 
capital. 
 
93.  Third, another aspect that is relevant for evaluating the optimal SAA has to do 
with pension system objectives, that is, to finance a minimum consumption during the 
inactive labor period of an individual (consumption smoothing).  The importance of this 
element has far-reaching effects for determining the optimal SAA and deserves to be 
discussed in more detail.
23 
 
94.  Specifically,  the  introduction  of  a  minimum  consumption  (or  income)  level 
makes an individual who wishes to maintain    of their total wealth invested in stocks, 
to effectively invest (in the case that        ) a percentage of: 
 
             
       
               
  
 
in stocks of their financial wealth, where    
  is the fraction of financial wealth needed to 
finance the present value in the moment   of consumption that requires financing, while 
   is the volatility of this last amount.  In this case, the quotient (    ) maintains the 
sign  of  correlation  between  the  stocks  and  minimum  consumption  level.  As  a 
consequence, investment  in  stocks depends  on two factors.  First,  whether the total 
wealth of the individual is or is not sufficient to finance the value of consumption or 
minimum income (that is:        
        
 ); and second, the sign of correlation between 
both quantities (that is,         )). 
 
95.  To analyze the effects of this case, assume initially that consumption (or the 
minimum income level) is an amount that is not associated with stock price (      ).  
Hence, equity investment will always be positive as long as the (total) wealth of the 
individual is sufficient to finance the present value of consumption flow or minimum 
income (   
           
  ).  Consequently, the individual will only invest in stocks if they 
have a surplus of resources, after having met the obligation to finance consumption (or 
the minimum income level). 
 
96.  The intuition of this is that if the representative individual possesses just enough 
wealth  to  finance  the  minimum  level  of  consumption  [e.g.,  (   
           
  )],  the 
optimal SAA will imply investing 100 percent of its resources in bank deposits, since 
this is the way to replicate the future value of this quasi-obligation (or liability) when 
      .
24  Now, if instead the future obligation is perfectly correlated with the stock 
price (      ) including an individual with just enough wealth to finance the minimum 
consumption flow, they will be able to invest the entirety of their financial wealth in 
stocks, since this method enables them to cover the obligations they face. 
  
97.  In agreement with the aforementioned, the motivations to invest in stocks can be 
diverse. For example, when the total  wealth of an individual is  hardly  sufficient  to 
                                                 
23 The analysis of this point is based largely on Castañeda and Fajnzylber (2008). 
24 This model excludes the possibility of ―gambling for resurrection.‖  
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finance  the  above-mentioned  requirement,  the  investment  in  shares  (if  any)  will  be 
possible only by the similarity between the behavior of stock prices and the value of the 
obligation.  Meanwhile, when the wealth of an individual is  sufficient to  cover the 
obligation, equity investment is motivated by stock risk reward (implicit in   ), which 
can be increased or decreased depending on whether       .
25 
 
98.  Figure 3 illustrates this situation for the trajectory of expected returns, under the 
assumption  that  the  obligation  at  the  time  of  retirement  corresponds  to  an  annuity 
equivalent to the minimum wage.
26  The primary difference with the figure presented in 
the base case (Figure 2) comes from the reduced availability of resources to  privilege 
the risk reward.  Although it is important to note that, again, a constant grade of risk 
aversion has been maintained.  Increased risk aversion at the end of the active s tage of 
the individual would implicate less investment in risky assets. 
 
 
    Figure 3:  Optimal portfolio profile for low income workers 
 
Source: authors‘ own calculations. 
 
99.  As shown, the introduction of a minimum level of consumption during old age 
has strong implications for an optimal SAA.  Particularly, the optimal SAA crucially 
depends on the similarities and differences between financial assets and the implicit 
liabilities in the pension system (that is, the level of consumption or minimum wage that 
is  being  sought  after),  combined  with  the  financial  situation  of  the  representative 
individual for which the pension fund investments were designed. 
 
100.  Another important element refers to the case in which the obligation in question 
corresponds to a pension or minimum wage for life (or life annuities).  In the latter case, 
                                                 
25 Note that the presence of financial obligations is another reason for which the SAA fails in being 
efficient in the mean-variance sense.  To see this, it suffices to consider the presence of an obligation 
that can be perfectly covered by investing in a single asset. 
26 The figure was constructed using the same parameters as in Figure 2, with       .  
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the  obligation  takes  the  form  of  an  annuity  whose  payment  is  deferred  until  the 
individual retires.  Then, since the price of an annuity can be replicated by a portfolio of 
government long-term bonds [see, for example, Milevsky (2006)], the analysis suggets 
that stock investment will be determined, on one hand, by the monetary sufficiency to 
finance the annuity in question, and on the other hand, by the correlation between stock 
prices and deferred annuities.
27 
 
101.  Fourth,  an  additional  aspect  that  is  relevant  to  mention  is  related  to  the 
uncertainty  of  the  parameter  values  surrounding  portfolio  selection,  and  must  be 
estimated before the investment decision.  In this sense, recent literature has shown the 
uncertainty related to the ignorance of the true value of the parameters associated with 
the process of generating asset returns, which results in a decline in investments for 
those assets whose returns are uncertain; Uppal and Wang (2003).  The mechanism in 
question  operates  via  an  increase  in  the  effective  risk  aversion  that  the  individual 
exhibits when faced with the aforementioned uncertainty. 
 
102.  For purposes of the SAA, these findings suggest that the greater the uncertainty 
about  the  parameters  governing  the  dynamics  of  returns  the  more  conservative  the 
portfolio selection should be.  This means, in agreement with the previous discussion, 
that the SAA should be assigned a lower prevalence towards the motivation associated 
with taking advantage of the asset risk reward.
28 
 
103.  Finally, the last  aspect  that affects  the  recommendations  emanating from  the 
base case is given by the quantitative investment restrictions.  In particular, there are 
two types of restrictions:  1) those that arise from regulations, and 2) those that originate 
from market incompleteness.  In the first case, these restrictions are motivated by the 
desire to limit the range of decisions to fund managers.  Usually, these restrictions seek 
to limit investment in certain asset classes (for example, low liquidity stock shares, high 
yield bonds, etc.), or alternatively, they can be motivated by the use of some restrictions 
of volatility of VaR (Value-at-Risk) portfolios.  The second type of restriction, on the 
other hand, comes from the degree of development of financial markets and consists of 
restricting instruments of investment (or asset classes) that are potentially attractive to 
pension funds, but that are not available for market investment.  This would be the case, 
for example, of a deferred annuity, an instrument that would be attractive to cover the 
risk of a price increase in the cost of financing a pension, but that is unavailable due to 
the inexistence of a sufficiently long returns curve.
29  
 
104.  The  relevance  of  these  restrictions  comes  from  the  effect  they  have  on  the 
investment in assets that are restriction-free, which have the property of being correlated 
with those facing restrictions.  This is the case, for example, of long-term bonds and 
stocks.  These are assets whose value tends to move in the same direction.  Due to this, 
                                                 
27 Note that Figure 3 was created under the assumption that the rate structure is flat, so the hedging of the 
changes in the annuity price fluctuations is due to investing in deposits. When the interest rate structure 
is not flat and the interest rates fluctuate randomly, hedging requires investing in long-term bonds. 
 
28 Note that as long as equity is a good asset to replicate the annuity price, the recommendation does not 
necessarily imply to reduce equity to zero. 
29  Conceptually, both restrictions can be accommodated within the parametric model; that is, for 
example,           and        ,, where     corresponds to the percentage invested in the class of assets 




investing in stocks can be motivated not by an equity risk reward, but by the capacity of 
this  asset  class  to  indirectly  hedge  pension  funds  against  increases  in  the  cost  of 
financing a pension. 
 
6.3  Conclusions from the model 
 
105.  In  practical  terms,  the  model  is  consistent  with  a  profile  of  decreasing 
investment in equities throughout the life cycle, mainly due to the gradual depreciation 
of human capital and the fact that it is comparable, to an extent, to an investment in 
long-term bonds. 
 
106.  The  limited  availability  of  reliable  long  term  data  for  Colombia  suggests, 
however, that the numerical results of the model should be taken with caution on behalf 
of  public  policy  makers.    Fortunately,  the  theory  of  portfolio  selection  has  shown 
progress in cases of high uncertainty with respect to the most important parameters of 
the model, and suggests that investment regulation should promote more conservative 
portfolios as a way of mitigating the data shortage. 
VII.   Reference portfolio 
 
7.1    The benchmark 
 
107.  This paper has argued for the need to establish a long-term reference portfolio 
that serves as a basis for designing the pension fund portfolio strategy.  Taking into 
consideration certain peculiarities of the Colombian case [see, for example, Rudolph et 
al. (2007)], the model described in the previous section shows the same trend of equity 
participation found in theoretical and empirical literature,
30 that is, the convenience of 
investing more heavily in equities in the early years of working  life and then gradually 
decreasing as one approaches retirement age.  
 
108.  Assuming some home bias constraints, the scarce availability of time series data 
in  Colombia  is  a  severe  limitation  for  creating  optimal  long-term  portfolios  that 
replicate  the  optimal  investment  trajectory  for  a  representative  individual.    While 
portfolios derived from optimization models for the case of Colombia are subject to 
errors, at least provide an unbiased estimate of the long term portfolio composition that 
optimizes the participants pensions (Figure 3).   
 
109.  With the support from financial and economic theory it is possible to design 
portfolios that follow long-term logic that are Pareto superior to those that portfolio 
equilibrium is derived from a purely competitive process. As suggested by Basak and 
Makarov (2009) and Castañeda and Rudolph (2010), a manager‘s interest in reaching 
prominent positions in the ranking of returns, and the use of the average return of the 
industry  for  the  calculation  of  the  reference  portfolio,  leads  to  short-term  asset 
allocations that are sub-optimal for contributors interested in receiving good pensions at 
retirement age. 
 
                                                 
30 See, for example, Campbell and Viceira (2002) and Hinz et al. (2010).  
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110.  This paper proposes a gradual strategy of convergence to a competition based on 
an exogenous long term benchmark portfolio. As a way of recognizing the weaknesses 
of the model and the bias of the average of the industry, this paper proposes the creation 
of  a  reference  portfolio  to  be  calculated  as  the  weighted  average  between  an 
exogenously defined long-term benchmark and the average industry return, allowing the 
relative share of the long-term benchmark to keep increasing (and therefore decreasing 
the relative share of the average industry return) to the extent that the availability and 
quality of data improves. 
 
111.  While the data is still insufficient (which might be the case in the next decade or 
so), the long-term exogenous benchmark should be derived from a combination long 
term  empirical  findings  and  consistency  with  the  preliminary  outcome  of  the 
optimization model.  It is important to emphasize that the benchmark be replicable by 
pension funds, and therefore should be based on market indices that are transparent and 
replicable for participants.  It is proposed that a benchmark portfolio is created based on 
four indicators: 
a.  Foreign Equities:  MSCI world (unhedged) 
b.  Local Equities: Colcap 
c.  Long-term Inflation-Indexed Government Bonds: To be built 
d.  Index of fixed income liquidity: IDTEX 
 
112.  The MSCI World is a global equity index that is well diversified and can be 
replicated.
31  The Colcap is a local equity index that is replacing the IGBC, due to 
methodological problems of the latter.
32  The Colcap is the only stock index replicable 
in Colombia.  The IDTEX, is a liquidity ratio of prices of fixed income instruments 
issued by the government, and may serve as a benchmark to evaluate other fixed income 
instruments, including corporate and mortgage bonds.  It is expected that other medium-
term  fixed income indices  may emerge in  the future.  The only index necessary to 
construct is a long-term fixed income index that is indexed to inflation. 
 
113.  Since Colombian interest rates are typically higher than the ones in developed 
economies, in ―normal conditions‖ it is not attractive for local investors to invest in 
foreign sovereign bonds; hence the proposed portfolio excludes foreign fixed income 
(bonds).  The primary reason for the lack of interest in these instruments is the strong 
rate differential in Colombia with respect to developed economies.  The risk is captured 
by  an  open  exposure  to  hard  currencies.    Reinhart  and  Rogoff  (2010)  suggest  that 
banking crises are typically followed by sovereign default.  The recent rescue packages 
for  Greece,  Ireland,  and  Portugal  are  just  one  more  indication  of  the  potential  and 
relatively unknown risks that exist in the sovereign debt market, especially after the 
recent  financial  crisis.  Foreign  fixed  income  can  be  introduced  in  the  Colombian 
pension portfolios in a later stage, when risks become more identifiable. 
 
114.  For implementation purposes, the pension portfolios identified in Figure 3 can 
be built as a linear combination of two of the three portfolios that are offered in the 
Colombian pension system. It is important to highlight that individuals can only invest 
in  the  aggressive  portfolio  through  active  selection  (not  by  default).    Based  on  the 
                                                 
31 More specificity of these indices will be required in order to error track these investments over time.  
32 Colcap is a market capitalization index and the IGBC was a market volatility index. The IGBC was 
heavily  affected  by  changes  in  few  securities.  At  some  point  for  example,  the  price  Ecopetrol 
represented almost one third of the composition of the index.    
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results presented by the model in the previous section, and taking into consideration the 
long-term  empirical  regularities,  it  is  proposed  to  create  a  preliminary  long-term 
benchmark with the following characteristics:
33   
 
Example of Benchmark for Colombian Pension Funds (Percentage of the Fund) 
  Aggressive  Moderate  Conservative 
Colcap  30  20  5 
MSCI World (hedged)  50  40  15 
IDTEX  10  10  30 
TESLPUVR
1  10  30  50 
1 Index of long-term government bonds indexed to inflation (to be buit)  
 
115.  These percentages should be understood as referential, but in the opinion of the 
authors,  they  correspond  to  a  reasonable  approximation  of  the  Colombian  pension 
system.   Except for methodological revisions every few  years, the weight of these 
ratios should remain fixed over time.   
 
116.  The proposed methodology is an important difference from the current synthetic 
portfolio used to benchmark the Colombian pension funds.  Currently, the weights of 
the synthetic portfolio reflect the effective participation of the pension funds in that 
class of assets. Since these weights change over time there is practically no influence of 
this  benchmark  over  the  investment  decisions  of  the  pension  fund  management 
companies.    Probably  the  only  conflicting  factor  of  the  synthetic  portfolio  is  the 
portfolio valuation of Treasury notes which is not easily replicable in the market (and 
whose composition is only known ex-post). The synthetic portfolio adds an unnecessary 
factor of uncertainty to the pension fund managers, and it does not add much value to 
fulfill the long term expectations of the contributors. 
 
117.  In the future, the benchmark weights should be determined by experts.  In order 
to ensure independence in the design of a long-term portfolio benchmark, it should be 
done so by a high level commission that operates on a permanent basis. The members of 
the  commission  should  represent  the  long  term  interests  of  the  contributors  in  the 
system, and clear terms of reference should specify their mandate. In order to ensure 
independence, the members of this high level commission could be appointed by the 
government,  and  eventually  ratified  by  the  Parliament,  but  most  importantly  the 
members of the high level commission should not have a conflict of interest with the 
government or the private pensions industry.  Based on technical studies and long-term 
considerations, this group should design long-term benchmark portfolios.   
 
118.  From a governance standpoint, the long-term benchmark should not be set by the 
government,  the  Pension  Supervisor,  or  the  pension  industry.    This  type  of  work 
requires a kind of capacity that probably is not present in any of these institutions.  
While pensions industry has developed some level of market knowledge, their focus 
tends to be more tactical than strategic.  Even more importantly, all of these institutions 
have  insurmountable  conflicts  of  interest  when  designing  these  portfolios.
34    The 
                                                 
33 Denmark‘s ATP built their lifecycle model (SP) based on three funds of funds. 
34 The experience in the USA previous to the crisis is that target date funds competed by returns among 
them by increasing the equity exposure. In the case of Lithuania, instead,  each pension fund designed  
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government, for example, has the incentive to use pension funds for debt financing, or 
to  support  various  government  social  programs  with  low  rates  of  return.    If  the 
benchmark were designed by the government, it is very likely that this would result in 
very  low  pensions  in  the  future.    The  pension‘s  supervisor  (Superintendencia 
Financiera) should not have other duties apart from supervising the industry - otherwise 
it would not have sufficient distance from investment decisions taken by the pension 
funds.  The industry, meanwhile, has no incentive to align its strategies with the long-
term, especially as it generates conflict with short-term returns. 
 
119.  Under  criteria  of  transparency  and  disclosure,  it  is  possible  to  replicate  the 
mandates of independency of the high level commission. Since legal restrictions can be 
an impediment for the commission of experts to determine the long term benchmark 
portfolio, it is possible simulate similar results with an advisory board.    Think of a 
framework in which the President of the Republic creates a high level commission to 
design this lifecycle benchmark portfolio.  Based on a number of studies, the high level 
commission submits a proposal to the government on the long term benchmark portfolio 
and a justification for such portfolio allocation. The proposal is submitted with high 
level  of  transparency  and  disclosure  to  the  Minister  of  Finance.  Although  the 
government may or may not adopt the proposal, if decides not to adopted it, it should 
respond  formally  (and  also  with  high  level  of  transparency)  to  the  members  of  the 
commission justifying the reasons for not accepting their recommendations.  
 
7.2  Building the transition 
 
120.  In order to ensure a smooth transition and undesirable changes in the domestic 
asset prices, the movement from a single portfolio to a multiple portfolios should not 
generate abrupt changes in portfolio allocation.  The changes should be gradual and 
therefore the reference portfolio parameters should be slowly adjusted to the long-term 
equilibrium.  The domestic asset prices should not be greatly affected to the extent that 
these changes are expected.
35  
 
121.  It is important to design a transition towards long-term parameters to ensure that 
the price of financial instruments suffers no abrupt changes.  At the time of the creation 
of multiple portfolio options, the regulations should allow financial instruments to be 
transferred from one fund to another (within the pension fund management companies) 
without selling titles in the market.  
 
122.  The Ministry of Finance should propose a structure of public debt issuances 
consistent with the needs of pension funds according to the benchmarks and consistent 
with the transition process towards a long-term equilibrium.  The local fixed income 
exposure in the transition should be defined in terms of float and later assume organic 
growth from historic simulations. In this regard, the availability of long-term inflation 
index bonds should be a priority, as the fixed income portfolio benchmark is likely to 
have a large component of these instruments. 
                                                                                                                                               
different portfolios with different risk exposures, and consequently individuals were unable to make 
meaningful comparisons. 
35 Although it was not possible to obtain information on t he influence of pension funds on asset prices, 
the growth in equity participation in the local market in recent months should be analyzed more 
thoroughly.  It should not be ruled out that pension funds have affected the price of equity assets, which 
would be worrying.  
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VIII.   Minimum return guarantee 
 
123.  It  is  well  known  that  minimum  return  guarantee  entails  a  convergence  of 
portfolios (herding effect). The problem is not the similarity of portfolios, but that they 
tend to converge towards sub-optimal portfolios. 
 
124.  Minimum return guarantee is a ―second best‖ mechanism in order to  protect 
contributors from unscrupulous managers or from uninformed contributors.  There are 
other alternative proposals for minimum return guarantee frameworks, for example the 
traffic light framework [see, for example, Rudolph and others (2010)], but these are still 
in  incipient  development  stages,  which,  in  the  absence  of  a  better  alternative  it  is 
appropriate to continue with existing frameworks.  
 
125.  The alternative of completely eliminating minimum return guarantee, without 
enhancing the supervisory approach, has been tested elsewhere and has resulted in risk 
allocations that are not easily identifiable by individuals, and divergence in the managed 
risks.  In the case of Lithuania, for example, the pension funds began to offer funds that 
were  unique  to  each  other,  and  in  many  cases,  with  much  higher  risk  levels  than 
reasonable for an obligatory pension system.  At the time of the crisis some of these 
funds suffered losses exceeding 60 percent of the value of the fund, since the risks had 
not been adequately measured.  Despite some recoveries in the aftermath of the crisis, it 
was a sense of lack of clarity about the objectives and the need of such risky portfolios. 




Table 1:  Design for the minimum return guarantee 
Country 
 










Min  (70%  of  the 
PPRS, PPRS - 2%) 
12 months  Monthly  -- 
Colombia  A  70%  of  the 
PPRS 
36 months  Monthly  30 days 
B 
 
70%  of  the 
RPS  
70%  of  the  
BVC  index 
return  
70%  of  the 
S&P  500 
return 
Minimum  Return  = 
(A+B)/2 
Chile  High Risk Funds =  
Min  (50%  of  PPRS, 
PPRS - 4%) 
Conservative Funds =  
Min  (50%  of  the 
PPRS, PPRS - 2%)  
36 months  Monthly  10 days 
El 
Salvador 
Min  (80%PPRS, 
PPRS-3%) 
12 months  Monthly   
Uruguay  Min  (PPRS-2%  ,  2% 
real) 
12 months  Monthly   
Bulgaria   Min (60 % of the 
PPRS, PPRS -3 %) 
24 months  Quarterly  quarterly 
Croatia  If  PPRS>0,  Min  (1/3 
PPRS, TD), 
If  PPRS<0,    Min  (  3 
PPRS) 
12 months  Quarterly   
Poland  Min  (50%  of  the 
PPRS, PPRS - 4%)* 
36 months  Bi-
Annually 
bi-annually 
Romania  Min  (PPRS-4%,  50% 
PPRS)  
24 months     
Slovakia  Conservative Fund =  
Min  (90%  ARS1, 
ARS1 - 1%) 
Balanced Fund =  
Min  (70%    ARS1, 
ARS1 - 3%) 
Growing Fund =  
Min  (50%  of  ARS1, 
ARS1 - 5%) 
24 months  Daily  bi-annually 
         
Sources: SBC, SP, KNF, NBS, PPSSC, CFSSA, CSSPP, HANFA. 
* The weights are capped at 15% and shares of the remaining funds are increased proportionally until 
they reach 100%.  
PPRS: Weighted Average of the returns of the system; ARS1 is the arithmetic mean of the average 
annual moving of changes in the daily values of competing pension funds, RPS: Synthetic Portfolio 
Performance; BVC Index: Colombian Stock Market Index; TD: Central Bank discount rate 
 
126. As  shown  in  Table  1,  the  minimum  return  guarantee  system  of  the  individual 
capitalization  system  in  Colombia  is  in  many  ways  more  restrictive  than  other 
countries with similar systems.  In particular, monthly evaluations are required by  
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the  Superintendencia  Financiera  while  in  other  countries  these  practices  occur 
quarterly  or  semi-annually.  While  from  a  long-term  perspective  having  monthly 
reports does not make much sense, the change in frequency of evaluations from 
quarterly to monthly occurrences happened a few years ago as a response to erratic 
pension  fund investment  behaviors  approaching the time of measurement.  Some 
pension  fund  made  abuse  of  last  minute  investments  in  order  to  show  better 
quarterly  results.  This  behavior  was  inconsistent  with  serious  asset  management 
focused on the long-term objectives of the pension system.  The introduction of risk-
based supervision frameworks, accompanied with greater responsibility on behalf of 
the pension fund management boards, would prevent these types of situations from 
happening again. 
 
127. This  paper  proposes  to  measure  the  minimum  return  guarantee  against  the 
reference portfolio (PR), which is the weighted average of the long-term benchmark 
and  the  industry  average  return  and  should  grant  higher  degrees  of  freedom  to 
higher  risk  funds.    In  particular  it  aims  to  increase  the  breadth  of  the  band  of 
aggressive and balanced portfolios, from the current 30 percent to 50 percent. Since 
it is possible to think of future returns in a range between 0 and 5 percent, it is 
recommended to impose the minimum of the range to be between a percentage of 
the reference portfolio return and a reference portfolio return minus a determined 
percentage.  The proposal suggest establishing a maximum difference of 4 percent 
for the benchmark for aggressive and balanced funds, and 2 percent for conservative 
funds: 
 
  Min (50% PR, PR-4%), agressive and balanced portfolios 
  Min (70% PR, PR-2%) conservative portfolio 
 
128. The possibility of moving towards quarterly, semi-annual or annual evaluations 
depends on the progress that the pension funds can make in terms of the framework 
definition  of  responsible  risk  management  and  the  progress  that  the  Financial 
Superintendent makes in risk-based supervision.  As an incentive for pension fund 
managers to improve their risk management frameworks, they will be subjected to 
an  annual  or  semi-annual  evaluation,  while  those  who  do  not  improve  will  be 
subject to monthly evaluations.  The implementation of a risk based supervision 
approach is the subject of a different study. 




Appendix A. The portfolio selection model 
 
1.   In  this  section  we  discuss  the  portfolio  selection  model  used  to  make 
recommendations in the paper. It is worth mentioning that the problem studied in this 
section is mainly normative, in the sense that the analysis aims to characterize how 
mandatory pension funds (FPO) should be invested in Colombia, as opposed to a more 
positive  analysis,  that  is,  aimed  at  explaining  the  reasons  why  certain  investment 
decisions are adopted by the pension fund management company in relation to those 
adopted by the FPO. 
  preliminary considerations 
  The  model  developed  is  the  result  of  considerations  that  include  three 
dimensions: 
  the objectives of the Colombian pension system, 
  the restrictions surrounding its operation, and 
  the investment opportunities available for the FPOs
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129.  The  need  to  identify  the  objectives  of  the  Colombian  pension  system  is  a 
fundamental  requirement  to  determine,  at  a  later  stage,  an  asset  allocation  that 
adequately serves these objectives.  In this sense, Barr and Diamond (2006) define the 
main  objective  of  contributory  pension  systems  as  delivering  sufficient  income  to 
individuals during the payout phase, leaving other objectives such as economic growth 
in the background.  In the case of Colombia, the aforementioned objective is compatible 
with the provisions of regulation (see, for example, Law 100, from 1993) and so it will 
be adopted in the future. 
 
130.  Moreover,  the  coexistence  of  a  distributive  pension  system  with  a  defined 
contribution,  as  in  Colombia,  causes  additional  considerations  to  be  weighed.    In 
particular, the investment of pension funds in public debt titles constitutes an important 
component of the domestic demand for government titles, which makes it necessary to 
evaluate the feasibility of proposing an asset allocation far from the actual situation.  A 
similar  situation  happens  with  domestic  equity  investments.    In  this  case,  there  are 
concerns related to the increasing size of the FPOs and the local stock market for the 
possible pressures that the said demand may cause for domestic asset prices.
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131.  Beginning with the aforementioned considerations, along with others related to 
the tolerance of pension fund losses and fiscal interest, it is possible to identify two 
constraints surrounding the operation of the Colombian pension system: 
 
  The optimal portfolio should be such that the annuitization risk is limited.  At the 
same  time,  it  should  safeguard  the  fiscal  interest  associated  to  the  event  that  a 
significant proportion of the population fails to finance a minimum pension equal to 
the existing minimum wage at the time of retirement. 
 
                                                 
36 The description of FPO investment opportunities is discussed in detail in Appendix B. 
37 Strictly speaking, the relevant variable is the percentage of outstanding shares that are effectively 
available to be negotiated, without the purpose of gaining control of society.  
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  The need for public financing and the existence of the distributive component in the 
Colombian pension system suggest that the optimal portfolio ought not to involve an 
investment higher than 50 percent of the debt portfolio of the central government 
(that is, excluding the debt issued by the Central Bank of Colombia). 
 
A portfolio selection model 
 
132.   In response to the objectives and restrictions previously mentioned, we next 
develop a life cycle model for portfolio selection that a representative individual faces.  
The model in question is in line with the tradition indicated by Merton (1969, 1971) and 
Samuelson  (1969)  four  decades  ago,  one  which  has  undergone  significant 
improvements  and  refinements  during  the  last  20  years.
38    A good revision of this 
literature can be found in the monograph by Campbell and Viceira (2002). 
 
133.  The proposed model is based on an optimization problem that summarizes the 
objectives of the pension system through an objective function of expected utility and 
attempts to capture, through an algebraic representation, the essence of the objectives, 
constraints and opportunities for investment that characterize investment decisions in 
the Colombian pension system.  In particular, the proposed function corresponds to: 
 
                               ,       (A.1) 
 
where      corresponds to the mathematical outcome,       is a subjective discount 
factor,               is  an  instantaneous  utility  function  (strictly)  increasing  and 
concave, that has as its argument the amount of the pension that is possible to finance 
(     ), which in turn depends on the accumulated amount in the individual account 
(      )  and  the  price  of  unitary  annuity  at  the  time  of  retirement  (      ). 
Additionally, the objective function considers the fraction           of the minimum 
wage         as the minimum level of the pension. 
 
134.  The adoption of the function in (A.1) is founded on capturing the objective of 
the pension system as much as the fiscal interest.  In the first case, this happens by 
making explicit the relationship that exists between the accumulation period and de-
accumulation of funds, which is reflected in the argument      that corresponds to the 
value of the pension that would be obtained at retirement (     ), instead of a mere 
amount accumulated in the individual account (  ).  This is achieved by capturing the 
risk an individual faces at the time of transforming the accumulated savings into a stable 
annuity during the period of destocking. 
 
135.  One of the direct implications of the proposed specification is that the optimal 
portfolio obtained, defined as  one that maximizes       , must take special care to 
                                                 
38 See, for example, Cox and Huang (1989, 1991), Karatzas et al. (1987), Dybvig and Huang (1988), He 
and Pearson (1991), Karatzas et al. (1991), Bodie et al. (1992), Cvitanic and Karatzas (1992), Kim and 
Omberg (1996), Bertaut and Haliasos (1997), Brennan et al. (1997), Cuoco (1997), Heaton and Lucas 
(1997),  Campbell  and  Viceira  (1999,  2001),  Barberis  (2000),  Xia  (2001),  Brennan  y  Xia  (2002), 
Wachter (2002), Detemple et al. (2003), Brandt et al. (2005), Cocco et al. (2005), Liu (2006), Detemple  
and Rindisbacher (2010), Buraschi et al. (2010), among others.  
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cover increases in the cost of financing a pension unit (  ), since in this context it 
corresponds to a risk-free asset.
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136.  Fiscal  interest,  for  its  part,  is  taken  into  consideration  when  measuring  the 
instantaneous utility that the individual gets for the pension that is capable of financing 
(     ), over the fraction (         ) of the level of minimum wage at the time of 
withdrawal (   ).  The individual's motivation, in this case, comes from obtaining at least 
     at retirement, where the amount is considered the minimum amount acceptable, 
since          , for      , with      . Because of this, as in the previous case, there 
will be a motivation for the optimal portfolio to procure coverage for the increase of 
minimum wage over time, because otherwise, the individual runs the risk of obtaining a 
pension below the said amount, and in consequence, a punishment of  . 
 
137.  The latter, in turn reduces the fiscal impact in the case that these individuals are 
entitled to the minimum pension, or rather, have a high probability of moving into the 
distribution system, since the optimal portfolio will avoid the associated costs of said 
event if at all possible. 
 
138.  For  purposes  of  considering  constraints  like  those  previously  mentioned,  the 
portfolio problem determines the search for the optimal [that is, one that maximizes 
     ], and those that satisfy the condition: 
 
                ,           (A.2) 
 
where         is  the  number  of  risky  assets  (in  the  sense  that  their  future  return  is 
unknown)  that  can  invest  their  resources  in  pension  funds,      corresponds  to  the 
weighted vectors that make up the investment portfolio in the instant          , and    
represents the set of admissible investment portfolios, and includes possible restrictions 
for investment in FPOs in certain asset classes, or specific instruments, valid in   (for 
example,                             , for some              ).  In consequence, the 
percentage invested in deposits over time, which, unlike risky assets  , have a known 
return  , given by       
   ,, where (') denotes the transposition of vector operation and 
                  .
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b.   A parametric model 
 
139.   Next, we will present a parametric model that fits within the general guidelines 
of  the  portfolio  selection  model  previously  described  previously.    The  parametric 
version considers the following elements: 
 
i.  Continuous  Time.    Time  evolves  continuously  throughout  the  investment 
horizon,           ,  where         corresponds  to  the  time  that  the  representative 
individual receives their pension. 
                                                 
39 According to Wachter (2003), the the long-term bond that matures at the time of retirement is the risk-
free asset for an individual that is infinitely risk averse. The general result (for any level of risk aversion) 
has been recently shown by Detemple and Rindisbacher (2010). 
40 It is worth highlighting that the characterization described accommodates restrictions of short -term 
volatility defined according to a reference asset.  In particular, Cuoco et al. (2008) and Pirvu (2007) have 
shown that a VaR (Value-at-Risk) restriction is equivalent to a quantitative portfolio restriction, and can 




ii.  Financial Market.  The financial market is comprised of       risky assets (that 
is, their price in       is unknown in the moment  ) and by a bank account.  The price 
of a risky asset             is given by:                                    , where  
    is the price in the instant  ,       is the instantaneous expected return to be received 
by  the  individual,       is  the  instantaneous  dividend  rate,            is  the  asset 
volatility, and           is a Brownian motion (normal) shock with mean zero and 
variance      in  each  coordinate.  In  turn,  the  price  of  the  bank  account  evolves 
according to               , where        y     is the interest rate received between   
and        for the individual.
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iii.  Labor  income  process.  The  growth  rate  of  the  contribution  made  by  the 
individual to the individual account given by            
        
      where   
  is 
the expected growth rate and   
  is the input sensitivity to the shock affecting risky 
assets. 
 
iv.  Unitary annuity cost.  The price in   of a unitary annuity with deferred payments 
until       corresponds to   
               
    
   , where       is the mortality force of an 
individual at the age of        that is alive at  , and   
  is the price in   of a bond 
(risk-free) that pays $1 in      . 
 
v.  Minimum Income.  The minimum income at the moment of divulgement is given 
by a constant     (see Appendix B). 
 
140.   Based on these parametric assumptions,  and denoting as     the value of the 
individual account of the representative individual, the problem of dynamic portfolio 
selection presented by the case of two assets (that is,      ) can be written as:
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                                     (A.3) 
 
where       
   
      
                                          
               
                     
                           
  
 
141.  The problem in question presents a major challenge for the dynamic portfolio 
selection  dilemma  of  standard  portfolios  [Merton  (1971),  Cox  and  Huang  (1989), 
Karatzas et al. (1987)]: quantitative portfolio restrictions, which are reflected in the set 
of admissible portfolios (  ). 
 
142.  It  should  be  noted  that  under  the  assumptions  of  the  parametric  model  it  is 
possible to characterize the set of admissible portfolios as: 
 
                                           . 
 
                                                 
41 See below the difference between the collected variables (       ) and those effectively prevailing in the 
market (     ). 
42 The results are shown for the case of two assets only not to complicate this notation further.  The 




where    and    are the quantitative investment limits.  For purposes of incorporating 
these  quantitative  conditions  we  will  apply  the  method  proposed  by  Cvitanic  and 
Karatzas  (1992), consistent  with  the inclusion of dynamics  of existing assets  in  the 
financial market, the Lagrange multiplier associated to the restrictions contained in   . 
 
143.  In particular, this involves setting (       ) as follows:                         
and                   , where (     ) corresponds to the expected return and the interest 
rate (instantaneous) prevailing in the market,     is the multiplier associated with the 
restriction  that  strengthens  the  optimal  investment  strategy  contained  in    ,  and 
                               is the support function of the multiplier  , with 
               , which also satisfies the property:                . 
 
144.   The method in question rests in the analysis and solution of a portfolio problem 
without quantitative portfolio restrictions (that is,       ), where the coefficients of the 
market are the receivables (       ), instead of the effectives (     ).  The key point is that 
the solution of this problem coincides exactly with that of the portfolio problem with 
quantitative restrictions, when   is effectively the Lagrange multiplier that forces the 
investment strategy to be contained in   .  The intuition of the result is given by the 
relationship between equity risk rewards in both cases,                         , and the 
direct impact that the latter quantity has in the scale of the destined investment of risky 
assets.
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145.  To  facilitate  the  exposition,  we  identify  next  the  solution  of  the  portfolio 
selection  problem  in  a  simplified  environment,  one  that  corresponds  to  the  version 
employed in the report. 
 
Result A.1:  Consider the parametric model developed above and assume that: 
  The function      is such that                          ,       , 
  the coefficients (          
    )are constant, 
  the instantaneous interest rate (  ) satisfies the dynamics      
                    
 , with   as the risk-neutral measure, and the 
coefficients ((  
         )) are deterministic functions of time. 
 
Thus the optimal portfolio is given by: 
  
  
   
        
   
          
        
    
  
  
     
   
  
 
   
       
    
 
where    
  corresponds to the fraction  of the pension fund for financing: 1) a pension of 
at least minimum wage (     ), 2) an efficient portfolio in the sense of mean-variance 
(      ), and 3) a portfolio that 'reverses' the effect of human capital in the aggregated 
investments    of  the  individual,  respectively.    For  its  part,    
     corresponds  to  the 
'coverage' component motivated by fluctuations in interest rate ( ) and the multiplier ( ) 
entailed in quantitative restrictions contained in the set    and its expression is provided 
in the proof. 
 
                                                 
43 In particular, the value of   is adjusted by reducing (increasing) the risk reward when the optimal 
investment exceeds (is inferior) the limit      (  ).  
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146.   Result A.1 characterizes  the optimal investment  portfolio in  an environment 
that,  despite  its  simplicity,  is  capable  of  capturing  all  the  relevant  elements  for  the 
pension fund case. 
 
147.   In  particular,  the  environment  in  question  considers  the  uncertainty  of  the 
expected changes in price of annuities (  ) and the minimum wage valid at the time of 
pension (   ), both produced by the uncertain fluctuations in the instantaneous interest 
rate.
44  When the evolution of the interest rate is unknown, the optimal portfolio  takes 
into account  the increases and reductions  in the expected cost of financing the three 
motives of investment identified in  Result A.1: minimum wage, human capital , and 
mean-variance efficiency. 
 
148.  The  optimal  portfolio  in  the  expression  is  broken  down  in  two  parts:    a 
component of mean-variance efficiency and a component of coverage motivated for 
three  reasons:  to  cover  the  increased  cost  of  the  portfolio  that  finances  minimum 
income, to cover the loss of value that human capital may suffer, and to cover adverse 
changes in the opportunity set. 
 
149.  One aspect worth highlighting is that investing in assets that are mean-variance 
efficient is subject to the financial sufficiency to cover (or finance) the minimum wage 
at the time of retirement. 
 
150.  Proof of Result A.1. 
 
We present the proof of the A.1 outcome for the general case of       risky assets, 
where the admissible portfolios belong to the set: 
 
      
                                                                
     
 
   
   
  
 
where (       ) are (progressively measurable processes) whose values are given by 
regulation.
45  It  should  be  noted  that           implies  that    
     ,  since  the 
contributions are non-negatives (      ), and the restrictions contained in     limit the 
possibility of the individual account going into debt; as much as the short sale, as going 
into debt with a risk-free asset.  Additionally, based on the definition    the support 
function  is  given 
as                                            
        
           ;  Cvitanic  y 
Karatzas (1992, §14.7-§14.9). Proof of Outcome A.1:  Consider the portfolio problem in 
a fictitious market where the coefficients of the assets are: (         ), with          
                   ,  with                             as  the  solution  of  the  indicated 
dynamics in the outcome       .  Given that                               , for any 
                 , then the solution to this problem coincides with the solution to the 
problem where       ; Cvitanic and Karatzas (1992), Karatzas and Shreve (1998, §6).  
                                                 
44 If this element were absent, both elements would be irrelevant for the optimal portfolio policy, since 
the future trajectory would be completely predictable, and the hedging motive would translate directly in 
an increased investment in bank deposits (to finance the future minimum wage), while the annuity price 
would be irrelevant, because it would be a constant value at the time of retirement. 
45 Note that the set in question accommodates the restrictions of the VaR; Cuoco et al.  (2008), Pirvu 
(2007), defined according to a reference asset.  
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Later, the problem (A.5) can be written as [Cox and Huang (1989, 1991), Karatzas et al. 
(1987)]: 
                                     
            




                      
  
 
from where you have   
                          ,                     
 
               
 
 
          
 
     is  the  (only)  stochastic  discount  factor  compatible  with  the  absence  of 
arbitration,               
     is the price for market risk [with        
          ], and 
           
   ..  Additionally, we have the optimal portfolio that finances the optimal 
amount of the desired final accumulated wealth   
 , a quantity from: 
 
      
              
              
 
    . 
 
As it is well known, the optimal portfolio can be obtained from the volatility of optimal 
wealth [see dynamics of   
  in (A.3)].  Then, in the case of preferences with constant 
relative risk aversion [that is,                          ]], a direct application of Itô's 
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with   
            ,     
   
                              
 
                  
 
  , and       as 
the derivative by Malliavin;
47 Detemple et al. (2005), Nualart (2006). 
 
151.  Similarly,  note  that  it  is  possible  to  identify  the  multiplier  associated  with 
restrictions  from  the  characterizations  already  presented.  In  particular,  note  that 
     
 
       ,                 requires that (see Detemple and Rindisbacher (2005) for 
more detailed work in a similar problem): 
                                                 
46 See, for example, Detemple et al. (2003, 2005), Detemple and Rindisbacher (2005). 
47The Malliavin derivative is a generalization of the concept of the traditional derivatives that extends the 
concept  to functions that depend  on the paths of Brownian  motion.  In  the  same  way  the  ordinary 
derivative measures the local change in the function, compared to a local change in the underlying variabl
e, the Malliavin derivative measures  the  change  in  the  function  (which depends  on the  trajectory of 
W) implied by a small change in the trajectory of W. The interested reader can refer to Detemple et al. 




        
                
        
  
  
                
         
       
     
        
                
        
  
  
               
         
       
     
with             
        
 , that is, it requires the multiplier to adjust the risk reward in 
a way that yields an outcome that easily remains within acceptable ranges. 
 
152.  Specifically, give that                    is always true (by construction), the 
multiplier is given by:
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Since the solution of the multiplier involves solving a system of "backward" stochastic 
differential equations (also known as BSDE) whose solution is unknown, we opt to 
approximate the optimal portfolio through the expression: 
  
                       
          
          
         
       
        
       
         
    ,  
that is, through the modified version of the analytical solution  it considers only the 
contemporaneous effect of quantitative constraints of portfolios contained in a set   . 
Derivation of   
   .  In the case where       ,        (that is, the restrictions can be 
active  only  one  at  a  time),  you  have         
          
        
 ,,  where 
                          
         
                         




   .  Then,  we 
obtain  
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    is already measurable, with                 ,                                max
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 max      as the maximum age of the individual's life; while  
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 ,  while the terms for   
    we 
have:      
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Appendix B.  Numerical implementation 
 
153.  In  this  section  we  present  the  numerical  implementation  of  the  portfolio 
selection model presented in the previous section.  The implementation consists of three 
stages: 
  characterization  of  the  dynamics  of  the  variables  of  interest  (asset 
returns, contributions to an individual account, minimum wage, etc.) 
  estimation/calibration of the parameters involved 
  calculating the optimal portfolio for the expected trajectory 
 
a.  The dynamics of quantities of interest 
 
154.  The following specific dynamics were considered from the base of available 
assets:
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where     is the price of a bond index with duration       ,               ,           
             , for              with        as the constant risk reward associated to 
the risk factor  .  In this case,       corresponds to the interest rate risk factor, while 
{           }  represents independent  risk  factors  linked  to  the  remaining  available 
assets. For their part,   
          
     
          , for            .  The correlation between 
assets   and  , with      , coming from                                     
     . 
155.  Note that the dynamics considered imply risk reward, volatilities and constant 
correlations over time, a modeling alternative that is mainly due to the short data series 
available, which make non-linearity models less reliable in asset dynamics, like mean 
reversion, or changes of regimen. 
 
b.  Estimation and calibration of parameters 
 
156.  In the calibration process diverse market indices were considered in order to 
allow  a  reduction  in  the  dimensionality  of  the  problem  and  greater  stability  in  the 
solution.
50  At  the  domestic  level,  the  asset  indices  COLCAP  and  IGBC  were 
considered, as well as the fixed income index IDX TES drawn up by Reveiz and León 
(2008).  Additionally, state bond indices were constructed from the interest rate curves 
                                                 
49 The dynamics in question correspond with the Cholesky decomposition of an asset base with correlated 
shocks, and on that used  by Detemple et al. (2003, §VI.A) and Munk and Sørensen (2010). 
50 This obeys the variance-covariance matrix of returns which tends not to be positively defined when a 




of  available  zero-coupon  bonds.    Meanwhile  externally,  stock  indexes  such  as  the 
S&P500 and the MSCI World Emerging Markets, as well as Lehman Brothers indexes 
for state and corporate bonds in the U.S. and Euro zone were considered.  Additionally, 
we considered the exchange rate of the peso-dollar (American), peso-yen, and peso-
Euro, with the purpose of considering the possibility of the FPO taking positions in 
foreign  assets,  either  covered  or  uncovered,  in  relation  to  risk  fluctuations  in  the 
exchanges in investment denominations. 
 
157.  In  the  characterization  of  returns  of  the  previously  indicated  indices,  the 
following  dynamic  for  risky  assets  not  directly  linked  to  the  interest  rate  was 
considered: 
       
    
       
     
   
                 
where    is estimated as the value of the 40
th percentile of the distribution of available 
data,    is the standard deviation of the asset            , with      , while    is a 
random shock that is distributed at normal standards. 
 
158.  For its part, in the case of the zero-coupon bonds, the dynamic proposal for the 
instantaneous  interest  rate  imposes  restrictions  (non-arbitrage)  of  the  price  of  these 
instruments, so that the return between   and        is given by: 
       
 
    
                                                         
where                               , and 
                 
     
                         
              , with             
  . 
 
159.  Something similar happens with the price of deferred annuity, whose price is 
given by: 
  
                             
 max
 
   
where                                is the force of mortality of an individual at age 
      ,
51  and                                                     is  the  strength  of 
marginal  mortality  of  an  individual  of  age        ,  that  lives  until        .    For 
interpretative purposes, it should be noted that the expression in question corresponds, 
simply, to the present value of the bond portfolio that is sufficient to finance a flow of 
$1 for the fraction of individuals who remain alive at the time  , according to  the life 
expectancy  of the insured group at the instant   and the cost of living. 
 
160.  The value of these model parameters was estimated or calibrated based on the 
following criteria: 
f.  Assets not directly linked to the interest rate.  The parameter    is estimated 
through the average of monthly returns (         ), while    is estimated from the 
sample variance of monthly logarithmic-returns [that is,                   ]. 
g.  Assets  directly-linked  to  the  interest  rate.  The  parameters  (       ),  linked 
directly to the dynamics of the interest rate were calibrated by the curves of available 
                                                 
51 The functional form of the force of mortality is known in literature as the Gompertz-Makeham type; 
Carriere (1994).  The justification of the parameters comes from the following arguments:  the parameter 
      captures the accidental factors of mortality, while (   ) are distribution parameters required to be 
estimated by the available mortality tables.  
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rates using minimization criteria of the sum of the squares of the residual adjustment 
results. 
h.  Deferred Life annuities.  The parameters (     ) were calibrated by the Chilean 
mortality tables [Pension Superintendent of Chile (2004)] using the same criteria as 
above. 
i.  Individual  Account  Contributions.    The  dynamics  for  the  contributions  were 
characterized  by  the  following  equation:                  
   
      
 
   
            , 
where    is the volatility of the process,    is a random shock with standard normal 
distribution     
   
                                  .  The parameters  (              
were calibrated by adjusting the trajectory of the expected contributions used by Viceira 
(2010, pg. 223) for the Chilean case utilizing the previously mentioned criteria, while    
utilized the figures used by Munk and Sørensen (2010) for the U.S. economy.  
Minimum Wage.  The minimum wage was characterized by:       .. 
Other parameters. R = 2,5 y T = 35. 
 
c.   Optimal portfolio calculation 
 
161.  The calculation of the optimal portfolio is preceded by the implementation of the 
proposed analytic solution in Appendix A, through the simulation of the conditional 
hopes involved. Based on the developed expression (that is,   
   ), which makes the 
theoretical model solution numerically implementable, the calculation of the optimal 
portfolio requires computing the quantities: 
     
      ,          ,              
 
   ,           
    ,            
   ,       
         
    , 
        
         
   ,               
    
 
   , 
problems that are possible to solve by means of simulations, according to the work of 
Detemple et al. (2003). 
 
162.  The  quantities  in  question  can  be  written  as  (with             ,  and        
     ): 
     
       
  
   
                      
 
               
              
  
                                
 




            
 
 
            
  
                      
   
 
                             
 




         
                             
                             
 max
 
    
          
          




     
     
    
     
  
   
                                            
 




      
       
            
                
 
 
   
              
    
 
 
          
                           
 
 




where   
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   , and                       . 
 
Simulations of interest quantities 
 
163.  Simply put, the computation of the quantities of interest requires a simulation of 
a system that involves variables (random):        
 
             ,    and              
and where the first two depend only on   , the third corresponds to the complete vector 
of  Brownian  movements;                            ..    The  system  can  be 
simulated through the following characterization [see, for example, Glasserman (2004, 
pg. 115)]: 
                                                            
                                                      
                                            
                   
     
       
                                                                    
                               
                  where       
                   , 
                                         
           , 
                                
           ,          
           ,while    
 ,      , 
    ,     ,        y   
  are analogs of the described quantities at the beginning of this 
section for the financial asset base. 
 
171. In addition, the specific coefficients are given: 
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164.  Likewise, the conditional expectations can be approximated as the following: 
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